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WORKERS RIGHTS FROM EUROPE: THE IMPACT OF BREXIT 
 
____________________________ 
 
ADVICE 
____________________________ 
 
 
Introduction 
1. Any decision of the UK to leave the EU, now usually called “Brexit”, 
following the forthcoming referendum will potentially have very significant  
implications for workers’ rights. Against that background, the TUC wishes 
me to advise it on certain specific issues including, above all, the likely impact 
of Brexit on EU-derived rights in employment, including health and safety.  
 
2. There is a short and long answer to that question. The short one: in broad 
terms, and subject to the specific terms of a future trading relationship 
between the UK and the EU providing otherwise, a future Government 
would have a pretty much unconstrained freedom of action in relation to 
those areas currently governed by EU social law relevant to employment. 
From a legal viewpoint it would be required to give effect to almost no legal 
rights in this area. Other international treaties which embody provisions 
protecting workers, even those signed by the UK, such as the European Social 
Charter of 1961 and some Conventions of International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), give workers far less legal protection than EU law against a 
deregulatory-minded executive. The same applies to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Because it principally gives effect to 
civil and political rights rather than socio-economic rights, it does not cover 
many important elements of the working relationship, such as pay and 
working time, and almost all those regulated at present by EU social law.1 If 
                                                 
1 The principal exception to this is Article 11, which has some important effect on the 
protection of collective bargaining, strikes, picketing and ‘sweeteners’ to leave unions: see Wilson, 
Palmer v United Kingdom [2002] IRLR 568 (leading to the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) ss 145A-F) and Demir v Turkey [2009] IRLR 766 (right to 
collective bargaining is an essential element of Article 11); but cf. RMT v United Kingdom [2014] IRLR 
407 (ban on secondary action permissible under Article 11). The discrimination protection in Article 
14 ECHR is only engaged if the discriminatory treatment falls within the ambit of another ECHR 
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the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) is replaced by a Bill of Rights, as proposed 
by the present Government in the Queen’s Speech, the protection the ECHR 
offers to workers in their working life is likely to diminish further. 
 
3. Which current EU-derived employment rights a future UK Government 
would in fact repeal, adjust or preserve is, of course, a much more open 
question, since it is affected by the political ideology of a future Government, 
the individual members within it, and pragmatic decisions about what is 
politically feasible at the time. But some indications of the targets of a future 
government with a deregulatory agenda, such as a Conservative 
administration,2 can be gleaned from long-standing opposition of some past 
UK Governments to many EU social rights, and from hints in official policy 
documents already issued. Provisions especially vulnerable to repeal in the 
name of deregulation or protecting business probably include, I think, 
legislation on collective consultation, which hardly fit with the current 
Government’s vision of the labour market; working time rules (a persistent 
thorn in the side of the UK Government, both Conservative and New 
Labour); some of the EU-derived health and safety regulations, the impact of 
which on employers the last government already sought to reduce; parts of 
TUPE, from which the Government has already tried to remove some ‘gold 
plating’; legislation protecting agency workers, which was long resisted by 
the UK and which is in tension with preferences for a ‘flexible’ labour market, 
as well as protections given to other ‘atypical’ workers; and some  elements of 
discrimination law to which businesses object most strongly, such as 
uncapped compensation or high levels of liability for equal pay (and perhaps 
types of discrimination on which there is much less political consensus, such 
as age discrimination). This is my view of what would be on the shopping list 
                                                                                                                                                        
right, though it may provide some protection against discriminatory dismissals which affect private 
life: see Boyraz v Turkey [2015] IRLR 164. But the Articles of the ECHR will not stretch, for example, 
to rights against discriminatory treatment in all aspects of the work relationship (including pay), 
rights to maternity and parental leave, protection of part-time, fixed-term and agency workers, 
working time protections, many of the collective rights set out in EU law, protections on transfers of 
undertakings and so on. 
2 Conservative Governments have exhibited the greatest opposition to workers’ rights, 
despite their recent conversion to national minimum wage legislation. But until recently the Labour 
Party, too, was hardly supportive of some EU labour rights, illustrated by its opposition to the 
Agency Workers Directive.  
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of a post-Brexit UK government with a deregulatory agenda, based on past 
history and signs in policy documents issued to date; I highlight some others 
below. 
 
4. Others may be better-placed than me to judge which social rights, currently 
guaranteed by EU law, are vulnerable to change in the medium to long-term, 
and which enjoy sufficient political consensus to survive. It would be naïve to 
assume, however, that most, or even many, of the social rights set out below 
are immune against future repeal. The last coalition Government, though to a 
degree restrained by the Liberal Democrats, made clear its preference for a 
highly deregulated or ‘flexible’ labour market, exemplified by the ‘Red Tape’ 
challenge and the BIS Consultation, Flexible, Effective, Fair: Promoting Economic 
Growth Through a Strong and Flexible Labour Market,3 which envisaged legal 
protections ‘limited to the minimum necessary’, said to be a core of 
‘fundamental protections’ based on ‘minimal intervention by Government’.4 
Conservative (and New Labour) Governments have repeatedly celebrated 
how the UK has one of the most lightly regulated labour markets among 
developed countries;5 the logic of its economic arguments is that further 
deregulation, along the lines of the USA model, will give it a competitive 
advantage. Already, in the Beecroft Report the last Government dabbled with 
proposals of extreme deregulation in relation to areas not governed by EU 
law (principally unfair dismissal law).6 If Brexit occurs, there will be no legal 
barrier to a Government legislating to create a labour market whose 
predominant feature is freedom of contract (for which read a legal system 
which permits the employer to dictate terms) - and in a context today where 
there is no longer the extensive collective bargaining coverage which can 
operate to correct the inequality of bargaining power between the individual 
                                                 
3 BIS, October 2011. 
4 Above, §§6, 9 at p 4. 
5 See e.g. the BIS Consultation, Flexible, Effective, Fair, note 3 above, at p 3. 
6 See A Beecroft, Report on Employment Law (24.10.11) which, as well as advocating the 
introduction of ‘no fault’ dismissal, also made clear its general opposition to labour market regulation 
in general, even going so far as to suggest the Government should risk infraction proceedings by not 
implementing the Agency Workers Directive. The report was apparently not adopted owing to 
opposition from the Liberal Democrats. 
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employer or employee or to compensate for the absence of legal rights.7 
 
5. Of course, the long-term trajectory of the EU itself, including in the sphere of 
social rights, is subject to change. Recent publications from the Commission 
refer to the need to avoid over-regulation and red tape and to lighten the 
regulatory burden above all on SMEs.8 However, so far as I am aware there 
are no serious threats to the social rights set out in this Advice, although there 
are some current consultations about the detail.9 What is much less clear are 
the social rights relevant to employment which may arise in the future at EU 
level, and from which workers in the UK would not benefit in the event of 
Brexit (for example, if the current proposals to make changes to health and 
safety law or to strengthen the rights of parents and those with caring 
responsibilities lead to new EU legislation).10 In light of both these 
considerations, the legal and factual premise of this Advice is that the EU 
social rights to which it refers will not significantly change in the foreseeable 
future: it takes those rights as a given, which dictate the policy choices open to 
any Member State for the foreseeable future.  
 
6. A final important introductory point is that there are few provisions of EU 
                                                 
7 For the evidence, see B Van Wanrooy et al., The 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. 
8 See e.g. European Commission, Better Regulation for Better Results - an EU Agenda (19.5.15, 
COM (2015) 215 final) at pp 5-7, drawing on the Better Regulation Guidelines (19.5.15 SWD (2015) 111 
final) as part of the Commission’s regulatory performance and fitness programme, or REFIT. 
9 The current Commission initiatives are set out in the document, List of Planned Commission 
Initiatives, dated 7.3.16 (http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/planned_commission_initiatives_2016.pdf). 
They include: a proposal to consolidate the information and consultation Directives to standardise 
definitions and make the law simpler and more effective; an evaluation of occupational health and 
safety with the aim of ‘increasing its effectiveness and efficiency’(see the Commission Work Programme 
2016, (27.10.15, COM (2015) 610 final), Annex I at §14 and Annex 2 at §16), including proposals to 
amend the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC to modernise it and to ensure a high level of worker 
health and safety; a consultation about the effectiveness of the Written Statement Directive 
91/533/EC in light of the increase in non-standard forms of employment; and proposals to amend the 
Posted Workers Directive to ensure a better balance between freedom to provide services and worker 
protection. A proposal to amend the Pregnant Workers Directive 92/85/EEC was withdrawn (see 
Annex II to the Commission Work Programme 2015), but see the consultation in note 10 below.  
10 See note 9 above and the Commission’s Consultation of the Social Partners under Article 
154 on Possible Action Addressing the Challenges of Work-Life Balance Faced by Working Parents and 
CareGivers (11.11.05, C(2015) 7754 final). See too the discussions about a ‘Pillar of Social Rights’, aimed 
at helping to foster upwards convergence in social rights in employment, though these are to be 
developed in the euro-area while allowing other Member States to join: see the Commission, 
Launching a Consultation on the European Pillar of Social Rights (8.3.16, COM(2016) 127 final). 
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law which limit the powers of a Member State to introduce national laws 
which are more favourable to workers. Many of the Directives conferring 
rights on workers state this explicitly; in other cases it is implicit in the goal of 
improving standards of worker protection. I highlight this below by reference 
to particular Directives. So any future Government more disposed than the 
present one to improving e.g. health and safety standards or granting workers 
new or stronger socio-economic rights would be perfectly able to do so from a 
legal perspective. EU law generally has nothing to say, for example, about the 
level of any national minimum wage, domestic unfair dismissal protection or 
domestic rules on strikes: these are general matters for Member States to 
legislate about and/or for domestic collective agreements.11 By the same 
token, a Member State can introduce more favourable rules in almost all areas 
of labour law already governed by EU legislation, as the UK has occasionally 
done.12 
 
7. The one exception to this rule is the effect that some of the EU economic 
freedoms, such as the freedom to provide services and freedom of 
establishment,13 have on labour standards not set out in national law. In some 
circumstances these freedoms may limit the power of public bodies to require 
compliance with minimum labour standards, such as wage rates above the 
prescribed national minimum wage, in public contracts.14 The same economic 
freedoms limit unions’ rights of collective action aimed at introducing labour 
standards, such as rates of pay, which are higher than those required by the 
Posted Workers Directive 96/71 (which, under UK law at present, only 
requires contractors from other Member States to comply with rules on pay 
and the like laid down by national law, not in collective agreements). These 
issues are discussed in more detail below.15 But these economic freedoms 
would not prevent a Government providing a higher level of protection for 
                                                 
11 See for an unusual exception, Alemo-Herron [2013] ICR 1116 discussed below in the context 
of TUPE. 
12 For example, by introducing an additional period of 1.6 weeks’ annual leave in regulation 
13A of the Working Time Regulations 1998. 
13 Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. 
14 See e.g. Commission v Luxembourg [2009] IRLR 288 and Rüffert [2008] IRLR 467, both of 
which are discussed below.  
15 See §§77ff below. 
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workers in national law (e.g. by increasing the national minimum wage), 
which would be binding on all workers in the UK, including posted workers. 
From the viewpoint of a Member State, then, the constraints on improving 
labour standards should probably be characterised as more political than 
legal (though the two shade into each other). 
 
8. The long answer to the question is set out in this Advice. Its structure is 
largely formulated in accordance with the questions I have been asked, but at 
the outset I provide a short introduction to how EU employment rights 
operate in the UK legal order, because this is important to the degree of 
protection given to EU rights, before giving an outline of the specific rights 
guaranteed by EU law. At the end of the Advice, I give a summary of the 
points made in it. 
 
The status of EU rights in the UK 
9. The UK’s accession to the EU by means of the European Communities Act 
1972 (ECA 1972) had radical effects for its legal order. Although the UK 
signed a Treaty of Accession to the (then) Treaty of Rome, and is now a 
signatory to the existing treaties post-Lisbon, the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU) and the Treaty of European Union (TEU), the legal effect of its 
membership of the EU goes far beyond those which flow from the signing of a 
‘normal’ international treaty by the UK government. 
 
10. ‘Normal’ treaties. Any international treaty, such as the UN Conventions and 
the ILO Conventions, ratified by the UK have some legal effect. There is a 
strong presumption in favour of interpreting English law in a way which does 
not place the UK in breach of its international treaty obligations, so that 
ambiguous words should be interpreted in accordance with the Treaty.16 But, 
quite apart from the power of the UK Government to denounce the relevant 
treaty and so put an end to any duty to comply with it,17 this rule poses no 
threat to Parliament’s powers. A treaty signed by the UK Government of itself 
                                                 
16 See R v Lyons [2003] 1 AC 976 (decided on the premise that the HRA did not apply to the 
offences at the time) per Lord Bingham at §13, Lord Hoffman at §§27-8; Hounga v Allen [2014] ICR 
847 at §50. See too Garland v British Rail [1983] 2 AC 751 per Lord Diplock at 771A-C 
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creates no rights enforceable by individuals. Where Parliament makes it plain 
by its language or otherwise that it intends to pass domestic legislation 
inconsistent with a provision in such an international treaty, that legislation 
will ‘trump’ its treaty obligations. The prime examples of this in the 
employment field are those ILO Conventions ratified by the UK, which have 
had little independent practical effect on UK labour laws.18 
 
11. The duties under EU law bite much more deeply. They are supra-national 
rules with which UK law must comply: Parliament cannot legislate contrary 
to them, so that EU law takes primacy over national law and operates as a 
limitation on its sovereign powers.19 Many EU rights, for example, are directly 
enforceable by individuals even in the absence of, or in direct contradiction of, 
domestic legislation. Where domestic legislation is inconsistent with EU 
rights, ultimately the EU rights must prevail. Books have been written on the 
legal means of giving effect to this duty, so I only summarise the most 
important rules below. 
 
12. The interpretation of EU social rights. The general approach of the ECJ is to 
interpret social rights in the employment sphere widely, not narrowly.20 By 
the same token, any derogations from social rights tend to be approached 
narrowly. This ‘rule’ is not universal,21 but it means that generally the rights 
considered in this Advice have been given a broad reach. It should be 
contrasted with the approach of the UK courts, where the focus tends to be 
much more on the specific language of the provision and where judges are 
unaccustomed to social rights, which are a recent addition to UK law, and are 
often inclined by intuition against them. Many examples could be given of 
how ECJ decisions on employment rights have reversed the over-narrow 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 As the UK has done in the case of some ILO Conventions. 
18 The principal means of using ILO Conventions has thus been parasitically, either by 
arguing that they inform Article 11 ECHR on e.g. the right to strike (see e.g. Metrobus v Unite [2010] 
ICR 173, RMT v Serco [2011] ICR 848 at §8-9) or because they inform EU law (as in the case e.g of the 
Working Time Directive, which refers to the ILO Conventions in its recitals and which has influenced 
ECJ decisions in this area). 
19 See Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at 593-4. 
20 See recently, for example, the Grand Chamber in CHEZ Razpredelenie [2015] IRLR 746 at 
§42. 
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interpretations given by domestic courts. Equal pay and sex discrimination 
are good examples;22 another is working time where in many cases the Court 
of Appeal, coming from a common law tradition based on the contract of 
employment, was resistant to any interpretation favourable to workers, only 
to be reversed by the ECJ.23 Without the corrective role of the ECJ, those 
domestic decisions would almost certainly have survived, depriving the 
social rights of much of their effect. 
 
13. Moreover, increasingly the ECJ has regard to other international treaties in 
interpreting the scope of EU social rights (see below). By this means 
provisions of some UN Conventions and ILO Conventions have had some 
influence on the development of EU social law (though the point should not 
be over-stated). The result is that, by this indirect means, those international 
social rights instruments can have a greater effect on domestic law than they 
would do merely because the UK signed an international treaty itself.  
 
14. Direct effect. Some provisions of EU law can be relied upon directly by 
individuals in national courts, provided they are sufficiently precise.24 They 
require no domestic legislation as a vehicle by which to bring a claim. This 
includes, first, some Articles of the Treaty; the most well-known in the 
employment field is Article 157, on equal pay between men and women, 
which the ECJ held in Defrenne v Sabena (No.2) [1976] ECR 455 was directly 
effective not only against state bodies but also against private bodies, 
meaning that it could be relied upon by individuals even in the absence of, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 Cf. e.g. Alemo-Herron [2013] ICR 1116 
22 See, for example, the important decisions in Enderby and Webb v EMO, both discussed 
below. 
23 Examples of cases where the confident analysis of Court of Appeal proved to be completely 
wrong include: Marshalls Clay v Caulfield [2004] ICR 1502 (rolled up holiday pay did not infringe 
Article 7); cf. Robinson-Steele [2006] ICR 932, ECJ (yes it did); Gibson v East Riding [2000] IRLR 598, 
CA (Article 7 not directly effective; cf. Dominguez [2012] IRLR 321, ECJ - Article 7 is directly effective); 
Stringer [2005] ICR 1149, CA (worker on sick leave not entitled to annual leave; cf. Stringer [2009] 932, 
ECJ - yes they were); Bamsey [2004] ICR 1183, Williams [2009] ICR 906, CA (no prescribed level of 
pay for annual leave under Article 7; contrast the ECJ in Case C-155/10, Williams v British Airways 
[2012] ICR 847 and Lock v British Gas [2014] ICR 813). 
24 See Francovich at [1994] ICR 722 at §§12-27 and Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2003] 
2 AC 1 per Lord Hope at 198F-203C (both cases also deal with the liability of a Member State to pay 
damages for the failure to introduce national legislation correctly implementing a Directive).  
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in conflict with, any domestic legislation.25  
 
15. The doctrine of direct effect extends, second, to Articles of Directives, which 
are the instrument used to give effect to most employment rights. So long as 
these Articles are unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied 
upon directly by individuals in UK courts, regardless of national legislation, 
but only against an emanation of the state (though the state has a broad 
meaning for this purpose and includes e.g. local authorities, NHS trusts, 
many privatised utilities, police authorities and others). Many Articles of 
Directives conferring employment rights meet this test, so that workers can 
rely on the Directives themselves in national courts. 
 
16. Third, horizontal direct effect extends to general principles and fundamental 
rights under EU law. These include the right not to be discriminated against 
on grounds of age: see Kücükdeveci v Swedex [2010] IRLR 346. Though a 
nascent category, the logic of Kücükdeveci extends to all forms of 
discrimination protected against by EU law, including sex, race, ethnic origin, 
religion and belief, disability and sexual orientation, all of which are referred 
to in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the ‘EU 
Charter’).26 It may also extend to sufficiently precise provisions in 
international conventions, such as those in the ECHR,27 though it seems not to 
the right to paid annual leave.28 These fundamental rights will then take 
automatic effect in the UK, overriding any inconsistent national legislation. 
 
17. Interpretative obligation. The second fundamental means of giving effect to 
EU law is by means of the interpretative obligation. Domestic law in the field 
of EU law must, so far as is possible, be interpreted to achieve the result 
sought by EU law, now usually referred to as the Marleasing duty.29 This 
‘broad and far-reaching’ obligation extends to all national law, and not only 
                                                 
25 The same applies to EU Regulations, though these are less used in the employment sphere. 
26 See on this Hennigs [2012] IRLR 23, where the ECJ referred to Article 21, and X v Mid 
Sussex CAB [2011] ICR 460, CA, where Elias LJ indicated protection against disability discrimination 
would also be a fundamental principle of EU law. 
27 See the discussion of the principle by AG Trstenjak in Dominguez [2012] IRLR 321. 
28 See AG Trstenjak in Dominguez [2012] IRLR 321. 
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implementing legislation or legislation which is ambiguous. It permits 
domestic courts to add words to domestic legislation to ensure conformity 
with EU law, provided that doing so does not go against the ‘grain’ or ‘thrust’ 
of the legislation.30 It is a much stronger duty than the duties of interpretation 
where the UK is merely a signatory to another international treaty. 
 
18. The Marleasing duty has had a radical effect in the domestic courts. It 
enabled the House of Lords to read in words to prevent avoidance of the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE) in 
Litster v Forth Dry Dock [1989] ICR 341 and to do away with the need for a 
male comparator in the case of pregnancy discrimination (Webb v EMO 
[1995] ICR 1021); it led to adding new provisions protecting against 
associative discrimination into the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 in EBR 
Attridge LLP v Coleman [2010] ICR 242; and it enabled the addition of words 
to the Working Time Regulations to ensure that workers received the same 
entitlements to paid annual leave as the Directive required: see NHS Leeds v 
Larner [2012] ICR 1389 and, most recently, Bear Scotland v Fulton [2015] ICR 
221. The strength of this obligation, perhaps especially where implementing 
legislation is concerned, means that this route almost invariably achieves 
compliance with EU law. The result is to give both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
effect to EU law, including employment rights conferred by EU Directives, 
even where by traditional rules of interpretation the meaning of the statute 
was clear.31 
 
19. Infringement proceedings and the Francovich duty. These individual rights 
of action are buttressed by two further mechanisms of EU law.  
 
(1) In the unlikely event that a provision of EU law cannot be given effect 
either by the Marleasing duty or by direct effect (for example, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
29 Marleasing v La Comercial [1990] ECR I04153 
30 The principle is summarised in Rowstock Ltd v Jessemy [2014] ICR 550 per Underhill LJ at 
§§40-41, adopting the summary of Sir Andrew Morritt in Vodafone 2 v Revenue and Customs [2010] 
Ch 77 at §37 of the relevant principles, including those from the speeches of the House of Lords in 
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557.  
31 On ordinary rules, for example, the cases listed above would almost certainly have been 
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action is based on a Directive against a private body), in some 
circumstances a direct action for damages can be brought against the 
UK Government for damages for its failure to implement EU law: this 
is known as a Francovich action.32 This could arise, for example, if the 
UK government failed to implement a Directive at all or on time or 
failed to modify domestic legislation in accordance with a ruling of the 
ECJ to ensure workers were protected in accordance with EU law. 
 
(2) The European Commission can bring infringement proceedings against 
a Member State which it considers has failed adequately to implement 
EU law. This can follow notice to the Commission from a third party 
such as a trade union. After investigating and delivering a reasoned 
opinion, the Commission may refer the matter to the ECJ and if the 
national government fails to comply with a judgment against it, after a 
further referral to the ECJ it may order the state to pay a lump sum or a 
penalty.33 Examples of this procedure successfully applying in the 
employment field against the UK include requiring it to introduce 
equal pay for jobs of equal value where no job evaluation study had 
yet been carried out into equal pay law.34 It also led to important 
amendments to TUPE 1981 and the collective redundancies procedure 
in s.188 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992 (TULRCA) so as, among other matters, to require consultation at 
workplaces where the employer chose not to recognise a union, to 
trigger consultation for dismissals involving changes to terms and 
conditions, to define consultation as being “with a view to reaching 
agreement”, and to remove limitations on the compensation payable.35 
 
20. Procedures and remedies. The final duties which emphasise the high level of 
protection given to EU-derived rights relate to the procedures and remedies 
for enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                                        
decided the other way. 
32 See Francovich at [1994] ICR 722 and Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1. 
33 See Articles 258-250 TFEU. 
34 Commission v UK [1982] ICR 578. 
35 Commission v UK [1994] ICR 664 
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21. By virtue of Article 19 TEU, Member States must provide remedies “sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection” of rights conferred by EU law. Similarly, 
by Article 47 of the EU Charter, which following the Treaty of Lisbon has the 
same legal value as the Treaties,36 “everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal” if their EU-guaranteed rights are violated, and 
“legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so 
far as necessary to ensure effective access to justice.”  
 
22. The need for effective protection of rights is expressed in various principles. 
First, by virtue of the principle of effectiveness, domestic procedural rules 
must “not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
rights conferred by Community law”.37 So, for example, in Levez [1999] ICR 
521 the principle precluded a limitation of two years’ recovery of arrears of 
pay in equal pay proceedings where the employer lied about the true value of 
a man’s salary and so caused delay in issuing proceedings.38 The principle has 
even been extended by the ECJ so as potentially to enable claimants to bring a 
claim in a specialist labour tribunal rather than the ordinary courts where this 
is cheaper and has procedural advantages.39 
 
23. Second, under the principle of equivalence, the rules for enforcing EU law 
must not be less favourable than those for enforcing comparable domestic 
rights. This meant, for instance, that claims for underpayments of holiday pay 
could be brought as a series of unlawful deductions from wages, under Part II 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), rather than a claim having to be 
made under the Working Time Regulations within three months of every 
occasion when holidays were under-paid.40 
 
                                                 
36 See Article 6 TEU. 
37 See the Grand Chamber in Unibet [2007] ECR I-2771 §§ 37-43. 
38 This led to changes to the Equal Pay Act 1970 now found in the Equality Act 2010. 
Requiring part-time workers to issue equal pay proceedings within six months of the end of each 
short-term employment contract was equally contrary to the principle in Preston v Wolverhampton 
Healthcare NHS Trust [2000] ICR 961. 
39 See the Grand Chamber in Impact [2008] IRLR 552. 
40 See Revenue and Customs Comrs v Stringer [2009] ICR 985. 
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24. A third, very important element of effectiveness is that, while it is for the 
Member State to decide on the form of sanctions for breach of EU law, those 
sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.41 An early 
manifestation of this principle, though based on the wording of the (then) 
Equal Treatment Directive, was Marshall (No.2) [1993] ICR 893, in which the 
ECJ ruled that where the UK chose to confer a right to compensation for 
victims of sex discrimination at work, that compensation had to be adequate 
for the loss and could not be subject to an upper limit (and had to include 
interest too). The need for financial remedies to give full compensation for the 
loss caused by infringements of EU rights has since been confirmed in other 
cases.42 Reflecting these principles, recital (33) and Article 18 of the Equal 
Treatment Directive, 2006/54/EC (on equal treatment between men and 
women in employment), for example, expressly states that it is inappropriate 
to include any cap on compensation. These principles on full compensation 
for loss have been reiterated recently in Case C-407/14, Camacho v Securitas 
Seguridad Espana, ECJ.43 
 
25. The provisions on adequate and deterrent compensation find their domestic 
expression in the absence of any cap for damages in e.g. discrimination, equal 
pay and other areas implementing EU rights, such as the punitive measure of 
protective awards for a failure to engage in collective consultation on 
redundancies under s.188 TULRCA.44 They can be contrasted with the low 
financial ceilings on compensation for infringements of purely domestic 
rights, such as unfair dismissal, reduced by the last Government to a 
maximum of one year’s salary or the statutory cap, whichever is lower.45 If 
Brexit happens, these uncapped levels of compensation may well be in the 
sights of a Government with a deregulatory agenda. 
 
26. Summary. The above rules illustrate how powerful are the duties to give 
                                                 
41 See e.g. Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-673, ECJ. 
42 See e.g. Metallgesellschaft [2001] ECR I-1727, ECJ and, in the field of worker consultation, 
Commission v UK [1994] ICR 664. 
43 Judgment issued on 17.12.15. 
44 See Susie Radin v GMB [2004] ICR 893, especially per Peter Gibson LJ at §28. 
45 See s.124(1ZA) ERA 
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effect to and protect rights conferred by EU law, including those rights 
conferred on workers in Directives. By various means the law circumscribes 
the powers of Parliament, the state and courts to act contrary to EU law. 
These rules are much stronger than the presumption that legislation should be 
construed in accordance with the UK’s other international treaty obligations, 
such as UN and ILO Conventions, which do not limit the UK’s freedom to 
legislate in a manner inconsistent with them. They are also a more powerful 
constraint than the corresponding provisions of domestic law giving effect to 
the ECHR, by means of the HRA. While the rules on interpretation are 
similar, under the HRA Parliament retains ultimate freedom, if it makes that 
plain, to pass legislation contrary to the ECHR. Hence (i) the potential for a 
declaration of incompatibility under s.4 HRA (and the absence of an analogue 
for infringement proceedings), and (ii) the defence a public authority has to a 
direct action against it under s.6 HRA, that primary legislation prevented it 
acting differently. The model of the HRA thus preserves Parliamentary 
sovereignty, though many critics pretend otherwise. By contrast, by reason of 
its membership of the EU, the UK must ensure that effective protection is 
given to EU social rights, and cannot legislate to the contrary (that is, unless it 
leaves the EU and repeals the ECA 1972). 
 
(1) The Key Rights in Employment 
27. The first question on which I am asked to advise is the likely impact of Brexit 
on EU-derived employment rights. A reasonable summary of the EU-based 
rights which apply in the employment tribunal is set out as Annex 2 to the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord 
Chancellor (No.3) [2015] IRLR 911. This list excludes, however, the important 
health and safety duties set out in various Directives including, especially, 
what is known as the ‘six pack’, and also omits some other relevant 
provisions such as EU data protection law. A comprehensive account of the 
relevant EU rights in this sphere is contained in C Barnard, EC Employment 
Law,46 though its focus is on the EU provisions and it gives little attention to 
the domestic implementation or the resistance to such rights among political 
parties in the UK. 
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28. As my Instructions recognise, it is only possible to give a broad overview of 
the relevant rights, which I provide below together with references to some of 
the key provisions or cases. All of these rights and standards are vulnerable to 
repeal in the event of the UK leaving the EU. Which ones would in fact be 
revoked is less a legal question than a political and sociological prediction; 
but I highlight below some of those which appear to be vulnerable to attack 
by, especially, a future Government whose priorities are similar to those of 
the present one. 
 
29. It is important to note, as I have already mentioned, that the social rights set 
out below are required standards but almost all are only minimum standards; 
they are a floor not a ceiling. They do not prevent a Member State, such as the 
UK, passing employment laws which confer a higher level of protection on 
workers. In many cases Directives state this explicitly.47 Many Directives 
equally make clear that they must not provide the basis for a lowering of 
existing domestic standards of protection.48 
 
30. Discrimination rights. Protection against discrimination is a fundamental 
aim of the EU, as stated in Articles 8 and 10 TFEU, and equality is now 
recognised by the ECJ as a fundamental value which takes priority over the 
economic aims of the Treaty: see e.g. Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-929 at §57. 
Discrimination in employment is now fully underpinned by EU law, which 
has had many important consequences for domestic law, in favour of 
workers’ rights and remedies. The relevant Directives and Articles of TFEU 
are set out below, which are given domestic effect by principally the EqA 
2010. 
 
31. The combined effect of these rules is to protect against the relevant kinds of 
                                                                                                                                                        
46 Oxford University Press, 4th edition, 2012. 
47 See e.g. the Framework Directive on Health and Safety, 89/391, at Article 1(3); the 
Contracts of Employment Directive 91/533, Article 7; clause 6 of the Annex to the Part-time Workers 
Directive 97/81/EC; Article 5 of the Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59; Article 6 of the Race 
Directive 2000/43; Article 8 of the Equality Framework Directive 2000/78/EC, and so on. 
48 See e.g. Article 6 of the Race Directive; Article 8 of the Equality Framework Directive. 
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discrimination at all stages of employment, from access to employment, 
through treatment at work including pay, to dismissal, and even including 
post-employment victimisation. The Directives contain special rules on the 
burden of proof to ensure that victims of discrimination have effective means 
of vindicating their rights.49 As a result of the ruling in Marshall No.2, in 
every case the Directives require that compensation fully compensates 
successful claimants for their loss.  
 
32. Many of rights in the Directives are or are likely to be sufficiently precise to be 
directly effective against emanations of the state.50 Moreover, as set out above, 
following Kücükdeveci, the rights may well be of direct effect horizontally, 
against private employers. 
 
33. Providing protection against sex discrimination and unequal pay between 
men and women were early EU social rights. Now the Equal Treatment 
Directive, 2006/54/EC, protects against direct or indirect sex discrimination 
in employment, including pay. In addition, Article 157 TFEU, formerly Article 
141 and before that Article 119, requires equal pay for male and female 
workers. This Article is horizontally effective, as the ECJ recognised long ago 
in Defrenne No. 2 [1976] ICR 547 and so can be relied on against state bodies 
and private sector employers. The important provisions of the Directives, too, 
are directly effective against emanations of the state. 
 
34. It is difficult to overstate the significance of EU law in protecting against sex 
discrimination. The ECJ has repeatedly acted to correct decisions of the 
domestic courts which were antithetical to female workers’ rights: a history 
could be written based on the theme of progressive decisions of the ECJ 
correcting unprogressive tendencies of the domestic courts. Any list is 
selective, but the important provisions and decisions include those in the 
following areas. 
                                                 
49 Originally derived from the Burden of Proof Directive 97/80 and now found in the 
discrimination Directives: see Article 19 of the Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC, Article 8 of the 
Race Directive 2000/43/EC and Article 10 of the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC, implemented 
domestically (now) by s.136 EqA 2010.  
50 See e.g. Marshall No.1 [1986] ECR 726 and Marshall No.2, above. 
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(1) In recognition of the foundational importance of equal pay in EU law, 
the ECJ extended equal pay laws to cover all forms of pay relating to 
the employment relationship, regardless of their source,51 and in both 
the public and private sectors, including pensions: see e.g. Barber 
[1990] ECR I-1889 and Collorol [1995] ICR 179, especially at §26. This 
led, for example, to changes to domestic legislation52 because 
retirement benefits were excluded from the domestic Equal Pay Act 
1970, and equalisation by means of ‘levelling up’ of pension benefits 
for men and women across almost all sectors. The impact was 
important for probably hundreds of thousands of women: see e.g. the 
part-time pensions litigation in the banking sector which took place at 
an early stage, the more recent litigation in the NHS known under the 
lead claimant as Preston, and other claims in the private and public 
sectors - which continue to this day53). 
 
(2) Clarifying that equal pay embraced work of equal value for which no 
job evaluation study had been done, and so potentially applied 
wherever there was evidence of systemic under-payment of women: 
see Commission v UK [1982] ICR 578, Enderby [1994] ICR 112, Danfoss 
[1992] ICR 74. The effect of these decisions, belatedly, drove the public 
sector bonus litigation which resulted in back payments to tens of 
thousands of women. 
 
(3) Extending indirect sex discrimination beyond where the employer 
imposed a requirement or condition,54 and laying down a strict test of 
objective justification where pay or other practices had a 
disproportionate effect on women: see e.g. Bilka-Kaufhaus [1987] ICR 
110, Kutz-Bauer [2003] IRLR 368. These decisions had considerable 
                                                 
51 Even in some circumstances allowing cross-employer comparisons: Lawrence v Regent 
Office [2002] ECR I-7325. 
52 At the time by ss 62-65 of the Pensions Act 1995 because retirement benefits were excluded 
from the Equal Pay Act 1970.  
53 See most recently Safeway v Newton [2016] EWHC 377 (Ch). 
54 See Enderby, above, and now  
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impact, in particular, on improving the position of part-time workers, 
who were and are overwhelmingly female. I doubt domestic law alone, 
without the input of the ECJ, would have achieved this result. 
 
(4) Ruling that pregnancy was a condition unique to women, so that sex 
discrimination could arise without the need for comparison with a sick 
man, and as a result giving women special protection against any 
detrimental treatment because of pregnancy or owing to absence in a 
protected period of maternity leave: Webb v Emo (above), Dekker 
[1992] ICR 325, Gillespie [1996] ICR 498. 
 
(5) Requiring effective remedies for work-related sex discrimination, so 
precluding caps on damages or some temporal limitations on arrears of 
damages: Levez (above), Marshall No.2 (above), Magorrian [1998] ICR 
979. 
 
(6) Protecting against gender reassignment discrimination, now one of the 
protected characteristics under the EqA as a direct result of the ruling 
of the ECJ in P v S [1996] ICR 795.55 
 
(7) Extending discrimination protection to embrace post-employment 
victimisation owing to the principle of effectiveness, which in turn led 
to explicit adoption of this in all the relevant Directives and domestic 
law:56 see Coote v Granada Hospitality [1999] ICR 100 where at §24 
the ECJ held that the right to effective judicial protection against 
discrimination between the sexes would be “deprived of an essential 
part of its effectiveness” if it did not protect workers against measures 
which a former employer might take in retaliation for post-
employment proceedings brought by the employee. 
 
(8) Introducing protection against harassment which led to important 
                                                 
55 Which led to the insertion of a new s.2A in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 by the Sex 
Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999; see now s. 
56 See now s.108 EqA 2010. 
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changes to domestic legislation, widening its reach to ensure it 
complied with EU law.57  
 
35. The other Directives on discrimination are more recent additions to 
Community law. Directive 2000/43/EC protects against discrimination at 
work on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, and the Framework Directive 
2000/78/EC protects against discrimination owing to religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation in employment or occupation. In keeping 
with the law on sex discrimination, they protect against both direct and 
indirect discrimination before, throughout and after the employment 
relationship. The decisions on sex discrimination will be, for the most part, 
read across so as to apply equally to them. 
 
36. There have been fewer important rulings on these Directives owing to their 
more recent introduction. But, again, the drift of the ECJ has been to interpret 
the provisions broadly, in keeping with a vision that protection against 
discrimination is a fundamental right which has a wide and intensive 
application in the workplace. This is highlighted by the following decisions: 
 
(1) In the sphere of disability discrimination, the ECJ has made clear that it 
will interpret disability discrimination law in light of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which the EU 
has approved, so as to promote the full and effective participation of 
persons with disabilities in society: see Ring [2013] ICR 851. In the 
same vein, it has adopted a wide conception of disability, extending it 
to include impairments which affect professional life and not just daily 
activities outside work: see Chacón Navas [2007] ICR 1. It ruled that 
protection in this field includes associative discrimination, leading to a 
re-interpretation of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which 
would not have been possible but  for EU law: see Coleman [2008] ICR 
1128. Associative discrimination is now, as a result, protected against 
                                                 
57  See EOC v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] ICR 1234, holding that the 
requirement of “on the ground of her sex” amounted to inadequate implementation of the then Equal 
Treatment Directive76/207/EC (see now Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2006/54/EC) and which led to 
changes to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (see now s.26 EqA 2010).  
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by the EqA 2010. 
 
(2) In race discrimination too, the clear signs are that the ECJ will adopt a 
wide and progressive approach because of the objectives of Directive 
2000/43/EC and the fundamental importance of equality: see CHEZ 
Razpredelenie [2015] IRLR 746, where it extended the logic of Coleman 
further and held that the aim of the Directive meant that it protected 
not only members of a particular ethnic group but also others who 
suffered less favourable treatment as a result of discriminatory 
practices.58 This decision have radical effects in the future for UK law, 
though its consequences have not yet been tested in the domestic 
courts. 
 
(3) Age discrimination was introduced by the UK government at the latest 
possible time, and only because it had to comply with the Framework 
Directive.59 It has since been very strongly driven by EU law, and the 
many judgments of the ECJ include the important ruling in 
Kücükdeveci, in which the ECJ determined that non-discrimination on 
grounds of age is a general principle of EU law, which was directly 
effective against private bodies, and which overrode inconsistent 
national legislation. The important influence of the Directive and the 
ECJ decisions on it is shown by two recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court. First, Seldon v Clarkson Wright [2012] ICR 716 where, in 
reliance on the ECJ case-law, Baroness Hale said that age 
discrimination (here a compulsory retirement age) could only be 
justified by public interest objectives, broadly categorised as inter-
generational fairness and dignity, so making it much harder to justify 
age discrimination and probably relevant to the abolition of the default 
retirement age in the UK. Second, Homer v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire [2012] ICR 704, where the leading judgment was again given 
by Baroness Hale, who explained that the test for showing “particular 
                                                 
58 See especially §§56-60. 
59 See the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, introduced under the ECA 1972, and 
which came into force on 1 October 2006 (regulation 1), the latest date for implementation: see the 
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disadvantage” in the equality legislation, derived from the EU 
Directives, was intended to make it easier to establish indirect 
discrimination60 - a decision which applies to all types of indirect 
discrimination - and stressed the strictness of justifying age 
discrimination by reference to rulings of the ECJ.61  
 
(4) Protection against religion and belief discrimination was enacted 
precisely to comply with the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC. The 
recitals to the Directive refer to the corresponding duty in Article 9 of 
the ECHR, meaning that the rulings of the European Court of Human 
Rights will be read into the Directive and hence domestic law. These 
include the decision in Eweida v UK [2013] IRLR 231 holding that an 
employer’s corporate image was not sufficient justification to bar the 
wearing of small religious symbols at work. Hence, whatever a future 
Bill of Rights may say in relation to the HRA 1998, in the workplace EU 
law will continue to follow the case-law on Article 9 ECHR, and the 
delicate balance it strikes between the objectives of employers and 
freedom of religion and belief.62 
 
(5) Protection against discrimination because of sexual orientation, 
introduced by the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003, was also a direct consequence of the Framework 
Directive.63 Prior to that, domestic law gave no real protection against 
this form of discrimination.64 Even after the ruling of the ECtHR in 
Smith v UK [1999] IRLR 734, holding that the ban on gay men and 
lesbian women serving in the armed forces was contrary to Article 8 
ECHR (on private life), it was EU law in the form of the Directive 
which led to regulations to address this form of discrimination, 
protection now cemented in the EqA 2010. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Framework Directive, Article 18. 
60 See §14. 
61 At §22-26. 
62 See most recently Ebrahimian v France, ECtHR, 26.11.15 (on Hudoc) 
63 The Regulations were introduced under the ECA 1972. 
64 See MacDonald v Ministry of Defence [2003] ICR 937, HL. 
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37. Future targets for repeal? Protection against sex, race and disability 
discrimination in the UK pre-dated EU law and has probably, for the present, 
gained sufficient political consensus that it unlikely a government of any 
political persuasion would repeal the laws in the foreseeable future in the 
event of Brexit. At the moment, too, the law is set out in primary legislation, 
the EqA 2010. But that is not to say that a future Government with a strong 
deregulatory agenda would not amend the legislation, though in what 
respects is not easy to predict.  
 
38. The extent of compensation for discrimination is one plausible target. 
Already, in the consultation which preceded the introduction of fees in the 
employment tribunal, the coalition Government proposed a form of cap on 
compensation if a claimant had not paid a fee at the correct level.65 This drew 
on its commitment to review discrimination awards as part of its 
Employment Law Review in order to address business fears about high 
awards; but, as the Government acknowledged in the consultation, because 
‘discrimination law derives from European legislation, it is prohibited to set a 
fixed cap on discrimination awards, which effectively restricts the policy 
options available to address concerns in this area’, and the proposal may well 
have been dropped owing to its potential incompatibility with EU law.66 
Implicit in the Government’s statement is that if it were not constrained by 
EU law it might well have capped discrimination awards. Given the 
Government’s often justifying action because of business fears of high awards 
-  illustrated by the consultation before fees, the one-year salary cap on unfair 
dismissal compensation, the action taken to remove civil compensation for 
breach of health and safety regulations (see below), and the immediate action 
to reduce businesses’ liability for holiday pay claims67 - it would be 
unsurprising if action were taken to limit employers’ exposure to liability for 
                                                 
65 See the Consultation Paper, Charging Fees in Employment Tribunals and the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (14 December 2011). 
66 A point made by some of the respondents to the consultation, including the Institute of 
Employment Rights. 
67 See the Deduction from Wages (Limitation) Regulations 2014, introduced swiftly in the 
wake of the EAT decision in Bear Scotland. 
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discrimination and, especially, large discrimination and equal pay claims.68 
 
39. The protection of pregnant women, too, may be a target given business 
objections to cases such as Webb. So too may be those forms of discrimination 
which were only implemented because of EU law and which enjoy less 
political consensus, in particular age discrimination. The fundamental point, 
however, is that the whole legal edifice is vulnerable to challenge: instead of 
complaining about progressive decisions of the ECJ, or the expensive 
consequences to business of discrimination law, if a domestic court arrived at 
a decision to which the government objected, the Government could simply 
change the law, and quickly. 
 
40. Pregnancy, Maternity and Parental Leave. As I have already mentioned, ECJ 
cases on the Equal Treatment Directive on sex equality in employment, 
originally 76/207 and now 2006/54, determined that detrimental treatment 
because of pregnancy amounted to sex discrimination. Recognising that 
pregnancy is unique to women and should not require a male comparator, the 
ECJ cases protected pregnant women against non-appointment to 
employment,69 dismissal because of pregnancy or taking maternity leave,70 
and discrimination in terms and conditions except pay during maternity 
leave.71 The cases were a marked departure from how domestic courts had 
interpreted and applied the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, illustrated by the 
judgement of the House of Lords in Webb prior to the matter being referred to 
the ECJ, where it made clear that it would have compared Mrs Webb with a 
man who was unable to work, so that her dismissal would not have been 
direct discrimination.72 It was only the ECJ ruling that caused the House of 
Lords subsequently to change its mind.73 The case-law is now reflected in 
Article 2(2)(c) of the Equal Treatment Directive, by which discrimination 
includes any less favourable treatment related to pregnancy or maternity 
                                                 
68 Prior to the decision in Marshall (No.2) there was such a cap in UK law. 
69 Dekker above. 
70 Webb, above, and Hertz [1992] ICR 332. 
71 See e.g. Thibault [1996] ICR 160. 
72 [1993] ICR 175. 
73 See the later decision [1995] ICR 1021. 
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leave under the Pregnant Workers Directive 92/85,  faithfully reproduced in 
s.18 EqA.74  
 
41. Protection of pregnant workers is supplemented by the Pregnant Workers 
Directive 92/85, which lays down minimum standards to protect the health 
and safety of pregnant women and which cannot justify a lowering of the 
standard in each Member State.75 In addition to requiring assessments and 
measures to protect against risks to pregnant workers’ health and safety,76 the 
Directive confers compulsory rights to at least 14 weeks’ maternity leave paid 
at the level of an adequate allowance which is least at the level of sick pay,77 
paid time off for ante-natal examinations if these have to take place in 
working hours,78 a prohibition on dismissal from the beginning of pregnancy 
until the end of the 14-week period (save in exceptional cases),79 and the 
maintenance of terms and conditions of employment during the maternity 
leave period, with the exception of pay, where the requirement is just the 
maintenance of a payment or an adequate allowance. 
 
42. “Family friendly” policies are reflected too in the Parental Leave Directive 
2010/18/EU, giving effect to the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave. 
The Framework Agreement lays down minimum conditions, cannot justify a 
lowering of the protection given to workers, and allows Member States to 
introduce rules more favourable to workers.80 They require non-transferable 
parental leave of four months for parents or adopters of a child (which need 
not be paid);81 time off for urgent family reasons;82 and protection against 
detrimental treatment or dismissal for taking such leave, together with 
                                                 
74 Article 15 of the Equal Treatment Directive also confers a right to return to a job, or an 
equivalent post on no less favourable terms, after maternity leave, provisions found in regulations 18-
18A of the Maternity and Paternity Leave Regulations 1999. 
75 Articles 1(3). 
76 Articles 4-7. 
77 Article 8 and 11. 
78 Article 9. 
79 Article 10. 
80 See Clause 1(1) and Clauses 8(1)(2). 
81 Clause 2(1). 
82 Clause 7(1). 
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associated rights.83 
  
43.  These provisions are for the present reflected in domestic law, through a 
combination of the EqA 2010, protecting against discrimination against 
pregnant women; the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999, as 
amended, providing for entitlements to maternity and parental leave; the 
Statutory Maternity Pay (General) Regulations 1986, Part XII of the Social 
Security and Contributions Act 1992 and other provisions, dealing with pay 
during maternity leave; provisions in ERA 1996, dealing with rights of time 
off for ante-natal care,84 suspension from work on maternity grounds,85 and 
time off for maternity, adoption and parental leave;86 and the health and 
safety protections in the Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999.  
 
44. The detail of these provisions is complicated, to say the least.87 Stepping back, 
the key points are the following. First, in some instances, and in tension with 
other areas governed by EU law, domestic law goes further than EU law 
requires in the level of worker protection - for example, in the period for 
which qualifying employees are entitled to statutory maternity pay and in the 
right to paternity leave, which is additional to parental leave and which does 
not derive from EU law.88 There is nothing in the relevant Directives which 
prevents this, however. Second, there is now a very extensive range of EU-
guaranteed rights which are unlikely to be weakened at EU level and which 
constitute a protective level which workers in the UK cannot fall below - in 
fact the Commission is currently consulting on strengthening these provisions 
at EU level, including proposals for introducing  special leave for fathers, 
carers’ leave, more flexibility in working arrangements for parents and carers, 
and improving the implementation and enforcement of equal treatment 
                                                 
83 Clause 5. 
84 See ss 55-57B 
85 Part VII of ERA. 
86 See ERA Part VIII. 
87 See the IDS Handbook, Maternity and Parental Rights (2015). 
88 See ss 80-8oE of ERA 1996 and the Paternity and Adoption Leave Regulations 2002. 
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rights.89 Third, in the event of Brexit these rights become vulnerable to the 
political mood of the incumbent Government. The cost of some of these 
benefits to employers and especially the state90 means that it would be naive 
to assume they will never be scrutinised for budgetary purposes. 
 
45. Part-time and Fixed-term Workers. These two Directives, the Part-time Work 
Directive 97/81/EC and the Fixed-Term Work Directive 1999/70, both 
implement Framework Agreements between the social partners. They provide 
a degree of protection for part-time workers and those on fixed-term 
contracts, though it seems their objectives are also to encourage such forms of 
flexible working. The rights have been implemented in the UK, in a 
minimalist fashion, by the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 2000 and the Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of 
Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002. Neither Directive prevented or 
prevents the UK introducing rules more favourable to workers, and nor can 
they justify a lowering in the level of worker protection in the UK.91 
 
46. Part-time workers are already protected under EU law because less 
favourable treatment of them compared to full-time workers will often 
amount to indirect sex discrimination since part-time workers tend to be 
overwhelmingly female, as many cases of the ECJ and domestic courts have 
recognised. So too may be other forms of ‘atypical’ working.92 The Part-time 
Work Directive, giving effect to a Framework Agreement among the social 
partners, supplements that protection. Though some of the provisions have 
been criticised for their narrow effect - for example the apparent need for an 
actual comparable full-time worker engaged in the same or similar work93 - 
the Directive does not require the group disadvantage based on sex necessary 
for indirect sex discrimination. It equally applies, for example, to a male part-
                                                 
89 See the European Commission Roadmap (August 2015) and the Consultation Document on 
addressing the challenges faced by working parents and caregivers (11.11.2015 C(2015) 7754 final). 
90 Most of statutory maternity pay (103% in the case of small employers) is recoverable from 
the Revenue: see the Statutory Maternity Pay (Compensation of Employers) etc. Regulations 1994.  
91 See clause 6 of the Framework Agreement on Part-time Work and clause 8 of the 
Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work. 
92 See Allonby [2004] ICR 1328. 
93 See clause 3(2) 
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timer worker in an all male workforce. Its broad effect is to require equal 
treatment, subject to the pro rata temporis principle, unless less favourable 
treatment of part-timers can be objectively justified - a relatively difficult test 
to meet.94 Its effect is to give some important protection to a form of working 
which is often used to accommodate some sort of family life.  
 
47. The potential bite of the Directive is shown by O’Brien v Ministry of Justice 
[2013] ICR 499 where, after reference to the ECJ, the Supreme Court held that 
fee-paid judges, though not “employees” as a matter of domestic law, were 
protected under the Directive because it applied to all “workers” and only 
excluded the genuinely self-employed.95 Illustrating the high threshold of 
objective justification, the Court followed the guidance of the Advocate 
General and ECJ, that unequal treatment could only be justified by “precise 
concrete factors...and on the basis of objective and transparent criteria”.96 
Saving of money by paying part-time workers less was not, according to the 
Supreme Court, sufficient because “the fundamental principles of equal 
treatment cannot depend on how much money happens to be available in the 
public coffers at any one particular time”.97 
 
48. The Fixed-term Work Directive works along similar lines, and aims to protect 
against discriminatory treatment of workers on fixed-term contracts and the 
abuse of successive fixed-term contracts. It gives this often precarious 
category of workers a general right not to be treated less favourably than a 
comparable permanent employee unless the difference in treatment can be 
objectively justified and requires the adoption of measures to prevent the 
abusive use of successive fixed-term contracts.98 In Del Cerro Alonso [2008] 
ICR 145 the ECJ, emphasising that the Directive was a provision of social law 
which should be given a broad reach, rejected the argument of the UK 
Government that clause 4 of the Directive did not apply to cover 
discrimination in pay - a further illustration of the UK Government’s stance to 
                                                 
94 See clause 4 and e.g. Kutz-Bauer, above, on the test for objective justification. 
95 See §§29-42. 
96 Supreme Court §46.  
97 See §§71-75. 
98 See Clauses 4 and 5 of the Annex. 
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rights of this sort, and an indication of what it would do in the absence of EU 
law. To the same end of enhancing the protection given by the Directive, the 
ECJ also made clear that objective justification for any difference in treatment 
required precise, and concrete factors based on objective and transparent 
criteria; the mere fact the difference in treatment was based on legislation or a 
collective agreement was not sufficient. The Directive not only forced the 
adoption of the 2002 Regulations, which mirror the Directive, but also led to 
various amendments to primary legislation to remove the discriminatory 
treatment of fixed-term workers in relation to statutory employment rights,99 
including the repeal of the commonly-used provisions which allowed 
employers to exclude fixed-term employees from the right to claim unfair 
dismissal and a redundancy payment.100 
 
49. Both of these sets of Regulations are, I think, vulnerable to repeal or radical 
adjustment should the UK leave the EU. Earlier Conservative Governments, 
after all, vetoed earlier attempts to adopt Directives to introduce fair 
treatment for ‘atypical’ work, the Part-time Workers Directive was only 
extended to the UK when a Labour Government signed the Social Chapter,101 
and in both cases it was EU law alone which drove the national implementing 
legislation. Though I am not aware of any published suggestions thus far to 
remove them, Brexit would breathe new life into the deregulatory agenda 
with which the Regulations are in tension. 
 
50. Agency Workers Directive. The Regulations implementing the Temporary 
Agency Work Directive 2008/104/EC of 19 November 2008, the Agency 
Workers Regulations 2010, are a still more obvious target for removal in the 
event of Brexit. The UK only dropped its opposition to the Directive after 
many years, when the CBI and TUC reached an agreement on agency workers 
in 2008, and has continued to protest about them since. Consistent with this 
stance, the Government enacted the Regulations to give the lowest level of 
protection it thought it could get away with which was compatible with EU 
                                                 
99 See regulation 11 and Schedule 2 to the 2002 Regulations. 
100 See s.197(1)(3) of ERA 1996; s.97 was repealed by the 2002 Regulations. 
101 For the history, see M Jeffrey (1998) 33 Industrial Law Journal 193. 
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law. For example, the Regulations require a 12-week qualifying period before 
an agency worker has a right to the same “basic working and employment 
conditions” as apply to comparable direct employees of the hirer,102 they 
adopt a narrow definition of what counts as “pay” for the purpose of equal 
treatment; and they make maximum use of what is known as the ‘Swedish 
derogation’, to enable employers largely to avoid the requirement of equal 
pay.103 
 
51. Whether this minimalist approach is consistent with the Directive has yet to 
be tested in the ECJ, and it is easy to criticise the limitations in the Directive 
(for example, it does not give agency workers a general right to equal 
treatment in relation to statutory rights, such as unfair dismissal) and the 
practical problems of workers enforcing their rights. But it is only because of 
the Directive that agency workers enjoy any degree of legal protection in the 
UK, however much the UK Government has sought to water this down. In the 
absence of the rights in the Directive - most importantly, to equal treatment in 
certain “basic working and employment conditions” (Article 5) and a right of 
access to “amenities or collective facilities” in the user undertaking (Article 6) 
- agency workers’ rights are minimal. Quite apart from their factual 
vulnerability to poor treatment, agency workers will often not have 
employment status under UK law and so do not benefit from the many legal 
rights conferred on employees only, such as unfair dismissal.104 The recent 
decision in Smith v Carillion [2015] IRLR 467 shows the problem very clearly, 
where Mr Smith was held not to be a worker or employee of the company for 
which he worked, and so was not protected at the time against acts of anti-
union victimisation. 
 
52. In the event of Brexit, I expect that any Government with a deregulation 
agenda would repeal or at least radically reduce the effect of the Agency 
Workers Regulations. The hostility of many businesses to the Directive and 
the protection of agency workers is exemplified by the Beercroft report for the 
                                                 
102 See regulation 5. 
103 See regulations 10-12 
104 Owing to lack of control by the agency (see e.g. Bunce v Postworth Ltd [2005] IRLR 557) 
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last Government, which took the extraordinary step of suggesting the 
Government should break the law by refusing to implement the Directive.105 
Conversely, if an administration favourably disposed to protecting this 
vulnerable category of worker wished to introduce laws which gave a higher 
level of worker protection than the base rules in the Directive, it could do 
so.106 
 
53. Working Time. The Working Time Directive, now 2003/88/EC, is another 
perennial target of attacks from UK Governments, perhaps especially those on 
the Right. Introduced as a health and safety measure under former Article 
118A of the Treaty (now Article 153), this Directive too only lays down 
“minimum safety and health requirements for the organisation of working 
time” and does not affect the right of Member States to introduce provisions 
more favourable to workers. The Directive applies to every worker and 
contains, in broad terms, rights to daily and weekly rest, limits on maximum 
weekly working time, paid annual leave of at least four weeks, and measures 
to protect night workers. It is supplemented at EU level by Directives 
applying to workers who originally fell outside the scope of the Directive, 
such as workers in the transport sector and those at sea:107 see e.g. the 
Working Time of Seafarers Directive 1999/63/EC and the Aviation Directive 
2000/79/EC. WTR also implement the working time elements of Directive 
94/33, limiting the working time of children. 
 
54. Consistently opposed to the Directive, the UK Government brought 
proceedings challenging its legality in the ECJ,108 only enacted legislation to 
comply with it (the Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR)) two years after 
the deadline, and sought to exploit any possible loopholes in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
and lack of a contract with the user undertaking (James v Greenwich [2008] IRLR 302). 
105 A Beecroft, Report on Employment Law (24.10.11), note 6 above. 
106 See Article 9 and Article 15. 
107 See the original Article 1(3) to Directive 93/104/EC, since amended by Directive 
2000/34/EC. The 2000/34 Directive brought transport workers under the umbrella of the Working 
Time Directive but at the same time permitted more specific community requirements for certain 
occupations: see Article 14. 
108 See United Kingdom of Great Britain v Council of the European Union, Case C-84/94, 
[1996] ECR I-5755. 
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implementing legislation.109 Since the reluctant introduction of WTR, UK 
Governments have campaigned for changes to the Directive at EU level (e.g. 
in relation to the rules on training of junior doctors and time spent on call), as 
well as criticising its effect. Recently, when the EAT ruled in Bear Scotland 
that holiday pay under WTR must include overtime payments, the 
Government immediately established a working group (without the 
involvement of any union or worker representatives) to consider the effect of 
the judgment, which led to the rapid introduction of legislation to protect 
employers against financial liability.110 In the event of Brexit, substantial 
changes to or wholesale revocation of WTR is predictable. 
 
55. The minimalist implementation of the Directive by the UK has led to 
numerous legal challenges in the ECJ which (I think) UK employers have 
invariably lost. Another source of criticism has been the use of individual 
agreements to avoid the limits on weekly working time. An empirical study in 
2003, for example, found that about 90 per cent. of employees in the 
manufacturing, financial, engineering and legal sectors were subject to 
individual opt-outs, as well as almost 100 per cent. of managerial staff in the 
hotel and catering sector, and between 10-15 per cent. of staff in the health 
sector.111  
 
56. Without the Working Time Directive there would be almost no legal 
protection against long hours of work in the UK, and no legal requirements 
for rest or paid holiday. The common law provides minimal protection. There 
is no implied contractual entitlement to holidays112 and no implied right to be 
paid for them.113 If excess working hours caused physical or psychiatric 
injury, this might give rise to a claim in tort based on the duty to take 
                                                 
109 Such as the derogation from weekly working time under Article 22 by means of individual 
agreements under regulation 4 WTR. 
110 Deduction from Wages (Limitation) Regulations 2014. 
111 See C Barnard, S Deakin and R Hobbs, “Opting out of the 48 Hour Week: Employer 
Necessity or Individual Choice? An Empirical Study of the Operation of Article 18(1)(b) of the 
Working Time Directive in the UK” [2003] 23 Industrial Law Journal 223. 
112 See Campbell and Smith Construction v Greenwood [2001] IRLR 588 (announcement of 
additional bank holiday on 31 December 1999 had no effect on workers’ holiday entitlement). 
113 See e.g. Morley v Heritage [1993] IRLR 400.  
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reasonable care for health and safety or the corresponding duty in contract.114 
But proving breach is difficult, absent an actual injury, no cause of action 
arises. Though various international instruments to which the UK is a 
signatory recognise limitations on working time as human rights - see e.g. 
Article 24 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 and Article 2 of the European Social Charter of 1961 - they are legally and 
practically irrelevant to a Government which is determined to ignore them, as 
shown by the position in UK law before WTR.115 
 
57. In principle, then, if the UK left the EU and WTR were revoked, an employer 
could dictate whatever contractual terms it wanted about working time: 
express terms could require working many hours a work, could leave workers 
‘on call’ for 24 hours a day or could confer no paid holiday at all. Prior to 
WTR, for example, it was not uncommon for workers to be granted no paid 
annual leave, as shown by some of the cases post-WTR. I do not share the 
view of some that the provisions of WTR enjoy a political consensus. At the 
very least I think a deregulatory-minded Government would make radical 
changes to the rules by which some time ‘on call’ counts as working time, to 
the rules limiting the maximum weekly hours, and to the level of pay and 
wide reach of the right to annual leave. But I suspect it would go much further 
than that: for glimpse of what is on the shopping list of those on the Right, see 
the private members’ Bill currently before Parliament, the Working Time 
Directive (Limitation) Bill,  sponsored by Christopher Chope MP, which seeks 
to allow employers to choose to opt out of working time rights generally and 
states that working time rules will not apply to doctors or health 
professionals, to on-call time not actually spent working, to travelling time or 
to how paid annual leave is calculated.116 
 
58. Collective rights. Several EU Directives require collective consultation with 
unions or workers’ representatives. It hardly needs to be said that the vision 
                                                 
114 See Johnstone v Bloomsbury [1991] ICR 269. 
115 But cf. some of the earliest employment legislation, which was about limitations on 
working hours: see e.g. the 1847 Act “to Limit the Hours of Labour and Young Persons and Females in 
Factories”.  
116 The Bill, of course, will effectively be blocked owing to the Working Time Directive. 
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of labour relations underpinning these provisions is not one shared by many 
within the Conservative Party or some elements within the Labour Party. I 
think, then, that these provisions are highly vulnerable to removal or 
substantial change by a future Government. A signal of this intent was in the 
consultation preceding the proposed removal of ‘gold plating’ in the 
provisions on consultation on collective redundancies, in ss 188-197 TULRCA. 
While the document gave a nod to the desirability of workers being consulted 
over ‘big issues’, it made clear it was not the role of the law to ‘dictate’ this, 
but simply the task of government to ‘create a flexible framework to support 
high quality consultation and to allow employers and employees’ 
representatives to conduct it in a way that suits their unique circumstances’117 
- in other words, deregulation. Freed from the duty to implement the 
Directives, a Government with such an agenda might well repeal these 
measures. 
 
59. To start at the beginning: prior to EU initiatives in this sphere, UK law lay 
down almost no duties on worker consultation, instead relying on free 
collective bargaining or, in the case of the now abolished wage councils, a 
form of statutory collective bargaining. The notable exception was the Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977, based on the model 
of  union involvement favoured by the Robens Committee and which was 
expressed in s.2(6) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA), 
requiring consultation about health and safety where the employer recognised 
a union.  
 
60. Those scant domestic requirements have now been greatly supplemented by 
several EU Directives. The earliest Directive at EU level, Directive 75/129 on 
collective redundancies, aimed to avoid employer strategies of ‘social 
dumping’.118  It was followed by others, the justifications for which include 
the higher productivity of companies with social dialogue, maintaining a 
balance between “flexibility” and security (‘flexicurity’ in the jargon), and 
                                                 
117 BIS, Collective Redundancies: Consultation on Changes to the Rules (June 2012), Foreword, p 4. 
118 The immediate cause was when in the 1970s AZCO, a multinational with employees in 
various European countries, decided it would make about 5000 workers redundant, worked out in 
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avoiding social dumping to the detriment of those Member States with 
established systems of social dialogue. They Directives cover the topics set out 
below (the Commission is currently consulting on consolidating Directives 
(1),(2) and (5) below):  
 
(1) Collective redundancies, originally Directive 75/129 and now Directive 
98/59, requiring consultation where redundancies cross the numerical 
thresholds in Article 1  “in good time with a view to reaching 
agreement” about e.g. ways of avoiding, reducing or mitigating the 
dismissals, which must be completed before notices of dismissal are 
issued.119 Information must be provided to assist in this process.120 The 
Directive is implemented by ss.188-198 TULRCA, since amended by 
the coalition Government to remove ‘gold plating’ by SI 2013/763. 
 
(2) Consultation under the Acquired Rights Directive 77/187, now 
consolidated in Directive 2001/23/EC, the aim of which is to require 
employers to provide information and to consult in order to address 
the social consequences of economic change caused by transfer of 
undertakings. It too requires information and consultation by a 
transferee or transferor which envisages taking measures in relation to 
their employees “in good time...with a view to reaching agreement”.121 
The Directive is implemented domestically by, now, TUPE 2006. 
 
(3) The Framework Directive on Health and Safety 89/391/EEC, which 
provided the overarching umbrella for the later ‘daughter’ Directives, 
requires consultation with workers and/or their representatives “on all 
questions relating to safety and health at work”.122 The supplementary 
measures include specific topics which must form the subject-matter of 
consultation, and require paid time off for training of safety 
                                                                                                                                                        
which Member State the costs of redundancies were lowest, and sacked the workers there.  
119 See Junk v Kuhnel [2005] IRLR 310, ECJ 
120 Article 2(3). 
121 Article 7(2). 
122 Article 11. 
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representatives so that they can properly exercise their functions.123 The 
Directive led to amendments to the Safety Representatives and Safety 
Committee Regulations 1977 to expand the subject of consultation.124 It 
also led to the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) 
Regulations 1996, providing for consultation with workers or their 
representatives where employees are not represented under the 1977 
Regulations by a recognised union. 
 
(4) The European Works Council Directive (EWC Directive), originally 
94/45/EC, now 2009/38/EC, which was extended to the UK after the 
Labour Government signed up to Social Chapter. The Directive 
requires information and consultation in undertakings with at least 
1000 employees and 150 in two member states125 and has been 
implemented by the Transnational Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations 1999 (usually known as ‘TICE’). The 
procedures are complicated but the requirements of the eventual 
consultation are not very rigorous - just the establishment of dialogue 
and the exchange of views126 - and the ‘default’ provisions in Annex 1 
of the Directive only require the European Works Council to meet with 
central management once a year. 
  
(5)  The Information and Consultation Directive 2002/14/EC had a long 
genesis, dating back to 1980, and was vehemently opposed by UK. It is 
now implemented in the UK by the Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations 2004 (or ‘ICE’). It applies only to 
establishments or undertakings employing at least 20 (establishments) 
or 50 (undertakings) in a Member State, and adopts a similar weak 
conception of consultation as that in the EWC Directive.127 In the UK it 
is the 50 threshold which applies. The Directive requires, in broad 
                                                 
123 See Article 11(5), given effect in the UK by regulation 4(2) of the 1977 Regulations and 
regulation 7 of the 1996 Regulations. 
124 See regulation 4A. 
125 See Article 2(1). 
126 Article 2(1)(g). 
127 Article 2(g). 
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terms, a Member State to establish arrangements for information and 
consultation about the development of the undertaking, the 
circumstances surrounding employment in the undertaking, including 
in particular any threats to employment, and decisions likely to lead to 
changes in work organisation or contractual relations.128 The UK has 
adopted a minimalist model, in which consultation need not be with 
elected representatives, let alone unions.129 
 
The Directives require, too, measures to protect employee representatives 
against detrimental treatment for carrying out their functions, implemented 
by various provisions of domestic law.130 The EU background and the need for 
effective sanctions informed the ruling in Susie Radin v GMB [2004] ICR 893, 
laying down the principle that damages for breach of collective consultation 
provisions131 should be based on the seriousness of the employer’s default, 
and should not be based on whether consultation would have made any 
difference. This decision led to many subsequent rulings giving relatively high 
awards of compensation for breach of the collective consultation provisions in 
TULRCA and TUPE. 
 
61. Legitimate criticisms have been made about these Directives by unions and 
workers, about the extent to which they in fact involve unions in decision-
making, fail to give priority to unions over other representatives, or lead to 
changes in management decision-making. The Directives do not require, for 
example, any recognition of unions, and nor is any priority given to unions in 
consultation at EU level.132  Nor do they go so far as to require collective 
bargaining as understood in international133 and domestic law,134 though the 
                                                 
128 See Article 4. 
129 ICE regulation 14. 
130 See e.g. ERA ss 44, 47, 48, 100, and 103 and e.g. ICE regulations 30, 32. 
131 On the facts, the protective award under s.189 TULRCA 
132 See on this Commission v UK [1994] ICR 664, in which the ECJ held it was impermissible 
for consultation on collective redundancies or transfers of undertakings to be restricted to workplaces 
where unions were recognised. 
133 See e.g. ILO Convention C98 and the European Social Charter 1961, Article 6, 
134 See TULRCA s.179, which refers to “negotiations” over the specified matters, not 
consultation. 
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duty to consult “in good time and with a view to reaching agreement” 
imposes an obligation to negotiate, according to the ECJ in Junk v Kuhnel 
[2005] IRLR 310. But any weaknesses, from the viewpoint of workers and 
unions, of the EU provisions is not a constraint on national law: none of the 
Directives prevent a Member State introducing laws which are more 
favourable to workers.135 If the law can play a useful role in this area, the 
Directives do not stop a national Government which wishes to intensify their 
reach and depth, and they provide a least a floor of compulsory information 
and consultation.136 
 
62. Acquired rights and TUPE. I have already referred to the Acquired Rights 
Directive, implemented domestically by TUPE. Though its provisions are now 
familiar to employment lawyers, the Directive marked a radical break with the 
common law in the UK. At common law, a transfer of a business from A to B 
operated as a dismissal of the workers employed by A because the 
employment relationship is personal.137 If the dismissal was with notice, the 
termination would not be a breach of contract; if it was without notice, 
damages would be restricted to lost earnings in the notice period. The contract 
of employment therefore provided employees with no sufficient remedies. 
Moreover, even if pre-TUPE these dismissals would amount to redundancies - 
the transferor, A, required fewer workers - this only entailed the pretty 
minimal statutory redundancy payments for those dismissed workers who 
had at least two years’ continuous employment.138 
 
63. The Acquired Rights Directive gave much greater protection to employees. It 
is of particular importance in a commercial environment, especially in the 
                                                 
135 See Article 5 of Collective Redundancies Directive; Article 8 of the Acquired Rights 
Directive; Article 16(3) of the Framework Directive (whose object is to encourage improvements in 
health and safety: see Article 1(1)); EWC Directive Article 12(2) and 12(5) (non-regression); 
Information and Consultation Directive, Article 4(1) and Article 9. 
136 Apart from that, the duties in domestic law are minimal: recognised unions alone are 
entitled to some information for the purpose of collective bargaining under s.181 of TULRCA, but the 
duty to disclose is much circumscribed. 
137 See Lord Oliver in Lister v Dry Forth Dock [1989] ICR 341 at 363. 
138 See Part XI of ERA. The dismissals might be unfair owing to e.g. procedural unfairness, but 
in such a context it is unlikely that a fair procedure would have led to employees keeping their jobs, so 
any compensatory award would probably be minimal. 
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service sector, dominated by compulsory competitive tendering (partly, but 
not solely, as a result of EU law in this area). The Directive applies to a wide 
range of transfers of undertakings in both the public and private sectors, save 
for administrative reorganisations within public administrative authorities.139 
In a radical break with the common law, it requires the compulsory transfer of 
employees, with their existing terms and conditions intact, to the transferee: in 
effect a continuation of the employment relationship.140 The only exception to 
this is old-age, invalidity or survivors’ benefits under company pension 
schemes;141 but this provision did not prevent the transfer of the right to a  
payment of full pensions on redundancy before normal retirement age, once a 
common feature in the public sector.142 The Directive protects employees 
against variations of their terms of employment owing to the transfer.143 
Employees are also protected to a degree against dismissals because of a 
transfer, save for economic, technical or organisational reasons “entailing a 
change in the workforce”.144 Duties of information and consultation in Article 
7, referred to above, supplement these duties. 
 
64. There are recent signs that the ECJ, in times of recession, is watering down 
some of the protection which it formerly treated the Directive as giving to 
employees. In Alemo-Herron v Parkwood [2013] ICR 1116 it held that 
employees whose terms and conditions were determined by a collective 
agreement while in the public sector were not entitled to the benefit of 
collectively-agreed wage rises which took place after they transferred to a 
private sector employee, who was not a party to the collective agreement. In 
doing so, it ruled that the objective of the Directive was not only to protect 
employees’ rights but also to strike a fair balance between the rights of 
                                                 
139 Article 1. 
140 Article 3. This is subject to an exception if the employee objects to being transferred, 
implemented by regulation 5(4) of TUPE to give effect to the decision of the ECJ in Katiskas [1993] 
IRLR 179, recognising the fundamental right of an employee to choose for whom he works. 
141 Article 3(4). 
142 See Beckmann v Dynamco Whicheloe [2003] ICR 50. 
143 See Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] IRLR 315 and Martin [2004] IRLR 74. It remains 
contentious whether TUPE 2006 correctly give effect to these judgments. 
144  See Article 4. These words provide a significant limitation on the power to dismiss: see 
Manchester College v Hazel [2014] ICR 989. 
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employers and employees. Having regard to the right to conduct a business in 
Article 16 of the EU Charter, the ECJ determined that a ‘dynamic’ approach to 
collective agreements was precluded by the Directive - a rare example of a 
ruling which prevented a Member State from adopting an approach more 
generous to employees. 
 
65. The Government rushed through amendments to give effect to Alemo-Herron 
in the same legislation designed to remove some elements of ‘gold plating’ 
from TUPE.145 This itself suggests TUPE and the Directive are not warmly 
embraced by the UK Goverment, and I do not share the view of some that 
businesses will be supportive of it. I think many businesses would welcome 
the repeal of or radical changes to TUPE, especially those large corporations 
which are dominant in contracting-out exercises (though I would be interested 
in the views of others on this issue). Potential targets include, I think, 
collective consultation, rules restricting harmonisation of terms post-transfer, 
and even the liabilities for transfer-related dismissals. While the decision in 
Alemo-Herron is regressive to workers’ rights and collective bargaining, Brexit 
offers the real possibility, highly detrimental to many precarious workers, of a 
return to the position in which transfers terminated employment tout court, 
with no more than the low levels of redundancy pay payable to those with 
sufficient continuity, or in which an employer can readily adjust terms 
downwards post-transfer by the simple device of dismissal and re-
engagement. 
 
66. Health and Safety. The introduction of Article 118A (now replaced and 
modified by Article 153 TFEU) by the Single European Act in 1986 led to many 
important EU Directives in the field of health and safety at work.146 The ECJ 
has given that Article a wide interpretation of what counts as ‘health’ so 
allowing Directives on working time to be introduced under it.147 The 
Framework Directive 1989/391, which outlined the general principles to be 
                                                 
145 See regulation 4A, inserted by SI 2014/16. 
146 The history is set out in J Clarke, Redgrave’s Health and Safety (LexisNexis). 
147 See UK v EU Council [1997] IRLR 30, §15. 
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applied to encourage improvements in the health and safety of workers,148 
including a general duty to ensure workers’ safety and health “in every aspect 
related to work” as well as worker participation,149 was followed by several 
important ‘daughter’ Directives. The key ones are: 
 
(1) The Temporary Workers Directive 91/383/EEC, requiring the same 
level of protection for agency workers and fixed-term workers as apply 
to permanent employees - an early measure extending regulation to 
‘atypical’ workers; 
 
(2) The Workplace Directive 89/654, laying down important rules about 
the safety of workplaces;150 
 
(3) The Work Equipment Directive, now 2009/104/EC, by which 
employers must ensure work equipment is suitable and can be used 
without risk to workers’ health and safety; 
 
(4) The Personal Protective Equipment Directive 89/656/EC, by which 
PPE must comply with EU safety standards and must be appropriate 
for the risks involved. 
 
(5) The Display Screen Equipment Directive 90/270/EEC, which lays 
down health and safety requirements for display screen equipment. 
 
(6) The Manual Handling Directive 90/269, laying down a structured 
procedure to adopt to address the risks from manual handling. 
 
67. These Directives are supplemented by many others addressing specific kinds 
of risk or worker, too numerous to list here.151 They are generally 
acknowledged to have led to improved standards of health and safety at work 
                                                 
148 Article 1(1). 
149 See Articles 5, 11. 
150 Supplemented by others, such as Directive 92/57 on temporary or mobile construction 
sites. 
151 See Redgrave’s Health and Safety for the complete list. 
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and to have improved workers’ prospects of success in personal injury 
litigation. As with most other provisions of EU social law, they specifically 
permit Member States to introduce provisions which are more favourable to 
workers.152 In the important case of Stark v Post Office [2000] ICR 1013, the 
Court of Appeal emphasised that the Directives could not lead to a lowering 
of existing standards under national law: their aim is only to improve safety 
standards, just as courts have held in other cases.153 A similar effect is seen in 
the recent Supreme Court judgment in Kennedy v Cordia [2016] 1 WLR 597 
where, in allowing an injured care workers appeal, the Court paid much 
attention to the Directives’ goal of improving health and safety, including the 
general principles of risk assessments and the need to protect employees 
against risks in every aspect related to work. 
 
68. A recent development shows the opposition of the last Government to these 
standards when they result in perceived unfair burdens on employers. The 
Directives were all implemented by domestic regulations under the HSWA 
and, formerly, a breach of any of these (and other) regulations which caused 
personal injuries gave rise to a potential civil action for damages unless the 
regulations stated otherwise.154 In 2013, in a move to reduce “burdens on 
business”, the coalition Government repealed the right to an individual civil 
action, despite this going further than the recommendation of its own 
independent expert.155 As a result, from April 2013, health and safety 
regulations are enforced exclusively by criminal sanctions (which already 
existed anyway), following prosecutions which in general terms only the 
                                                 
152 Framework Directive, Article 1(3). 
153 See e.g. Robb v Salamis [2007] ICR 175, per Lord Hope at §15. 
154 See s.47(2) HSWA 1974. The only significant regulations which formerly excluded civil 
liability were the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, but this exclusion was 
removed in relation to employees in 2006: see regulation 22, as amended.  
155 See s.69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, amending s.47 HSWA. The 
repeal of civil liability followed the report of Professor Löfstdet, Reclaiming Health and Safety for All 
(November 2011), commissioned by the government to look into the scope for reducing the burden of 
health and safety regulation on business. As Professor Löfstdet pointed out in his later report, 
Reclaiming Health and Safety for All: A Review of Progress One Year On (January 2013), the removal of 
civil liability was more “far–reaching” than he anticipated (p 11). The Government justified its 
response by the need to remove strict liability when an employer was not at fault and to tackle the 
“perception [sic] of a compensation culture”: see Impact Assessment, Strict Liability in Health and Safety 
Litigation, 11 June 2012, at §17-18. 
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Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or the Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
not an individual, can bring.156 Removing civil liability for breach can only 
have a detrimental impact on workers’ health and safety in general and on 
personal injury claimants in particular. It is not clear if this move is compatible 
with EU law on effective sanctions which are equivalent to infringements of 
analogous provisions of national law.157 
 
69. This legislative development serves to illustrate, first, that it can no longer be 
assumed that there is a political consensus about improving health and safety 
standards at work, despite the long history of legislation in this area which has 
mostly been left intact by successive Governments (or in some cases 
introduced by Conservative administrations, including some of the Factories 
Acts and the HSWA itself). Second, and linked to the first point, if the last 
Government were not constrained by EU law to provide some effective remedy 
for breach of the Directives - which it now purports to do so by criminal law 
alone, without civil claims - it may well have taken the further step, consistent 
with its logic of reducing the ‘perception’ of burdens on business by repealing 
in whole or in part some of the health and safety regulations which implement 
EU law. In this light I think that many of the regulations which implement 
duties in EU health and safety Directives are both legally and factually 
vulnerable in the event of Brexit, to be replaced largely by a common law duty 
of care alone.  
 
70. Rights on Insolvency. Under the Insolvency Directive, now consolidated in 
Directive 2008/94/EC, each Member State is required to guarantee employees 
the payment of outstanding claims arising out of contracts of employment or 
the employment relationship against employers who are in insolvency.158 This 
means that the State must pay the sums owing to employees whose employer 
cannot pay owing to insolvency. Once again, implementation of the Directive 
cannot be a means of reducing the existing level of protection of workers, and 
                                                 
156 See ss 38-39 HSWA. 
157 See above and Article 47 of the EU Charter; but cf. R (URTU) v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2013] IRLR 890, CA: sufficient to have criminal sanctions only for breach of Road Transport 
Working Time Directive. 
158 See Article3. 
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nor does the Directive prevent the UK introducing rules which are more 
favourable to workers.159 Member States may (i) limit the period of pay which 
guaranteed, but subject to a minimum of eight weeks’ remuneration;160 and (ii) 
set a ceiling on the payments, provided this is compatible with the social 
objectives of the Directive. Article 8 of the Directive separately requires the 
guaranteeing of pension liabilities, which has proven to be very important in 
protecting the rights of workers in the UK: see Robins v Secretary of State For 
Work and Pensions [2007] ICR 779, ECJ, holding that the then state guarantee 
under the Financial Assistance Scheme of 49% of pension benefits was 
insufficient protection.161  
 
71. To implement these provisions, Chapter VI of Part XI of ERA 1996 allows an 
employee to claim against the Secretary of State for a redundancy payment 
when the employer is insolvent and the correct sum has not been paid. In 
addition, the Financial Assistance Scheme protects the pensions of employees 
of insolvent companies. Lastly, Part XII of ERA gives an employee whose 
employment has been terminated the right to apply to the Secretary of State 
for certain debts where his employer has become insolvent.162 Mirroring the 
provisions of the Directive, the guaranteed period of pay is limited to eight 
weeks and there is a ceiling of £475 on the amount payable for each week.163 
These provisions are very important in practice: it is very common where a 
plant closes following the insolvency of an employer for the workers to 
recover significant sums in respect of arrears of pay against the state, claims 
which would be worthless against the employer. As I write, for example, it has 
been reported that the steel workers who were made redundant at Redcar will 
receive £6.25 million from the Government because of the failure of their 
insolvent employer to consult them properly in relation to collective 
redundancies.164 In the event of Brexit, when there will be nothing to underpin 
these duties, I think the domestic provisions will be vulnerable. Given the 
                                                 
159 Article 11. 
160 Article 4(2). 
161 See similarly Hogan v Minister for Social and Family Affairs [2013] 3 CMLR 27. 
162 See s.182. 
163 See ERA ss 184, 186. 
164 Protected awards are guaranteed under s. 184 of ERA. 
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current climate of austerity, a future Government may be very inclined to 
decide that these are losses which it should not bear. 
 
72. Written Terms of Employment. The Written Statement Directive 91/533/EEC 
which, in the interests of protecting workers by providing them with sufficient 
information about their rights, requires an employer to provide “every paid 
employee ”with written details of their essential conditions of service.165 The 
Commission is currently consulting about changes to the Directive owing to 
the growth in forms of work other than standard employment. UK law on this 
pre-dated the Directive but it now guarantees the rights in Part I of ERA. 
 
73. Data Protection at Work. The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which is 
not restricted to the workplace, drove the enactment of the Data Protection 
Act 1998. That Act protects the processing of personal data, including sensitive 
personal data such as political opinions, trade union membership, health and 
sexual life.166 Its detail is complicated but the key point is that it plays an 
important role in protecting workers against infringements of a broad 
conception of private life, including e.g. by monitoring their communications 
at work, as shown by the detail of the of the Information Commissioner’s 
Employment Practices Data Protection Code, issued under s.51(3) of the Act. The 
action which led to the public exposure of blacklisting in the construction 
industry, for example, was taken under this Act,167 and if the Act were in force 
at the relevant time it would have provided some means of obtaining 
compensation for blacklisted workers.168  The Directive will be replaced in the 
near future with a new Data Protection Regulation, albeit based on similar 
principles.169 While compliance with EU data protection legislation gives rise 
to many difficult issues beyond employment (e.g. where data are transferred 
                                                 
165 Article 1. 
166 See ss 1-2. 
167 Following a search by the Information Commissioner, the chief officer of the ‘Consulting 
Association’, Ian Kerr, was fined £5,000 for breach of the DPA 1998, and was also issued with an 
enforcement notice under s.40 DPA 1998, as were 14 construction companies, to stop them using the 
database: see report of the Scottish Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (part of the UK 
Parliament) published on 16 April 2013, Blacklisting in Employment: Interim Report, pp 12-13. 
168 The earlier Act, the Data Protection Act 1984, did not apply to paper systems, as were used 
by the Consulting Association, and the DPA 1998 only came into force in March 2000. 
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abroad), the protection it gives against e.g. monitoring at work or the making 
of subject access requests is hardly welcomed by businesses. 
 
74. The EU Charter. The EU Charter held out the prospect of its being a 
significant source of workers’ rights. Title IV, in particular, entitled 
‘Solidarity’, contains a list of key rights relevant to workers, such as rights to 
information and consultation, rights to collective bargaining (including to take 
strikes), protection against unjustified dismissal, and right to fair and just 
working conditions. But,  quite apart from the issue of whether Title IV 
applies to the UK owing to Protocol 30,170 in practice it has turned out to be 
much less important than many unions thought or hoped. The ECJ has greatly 
limited its effect and to date has not given the rights an independent existence 
by which they can be directly enforced in the absence of further provisions of 
EU law. The net result is that in this context to date the EU Charter has not 
added much if anything to the protection already provided by EU Directives: 
see e.g. Association de Médiation Sociale [2014] IRLR310 (Article 27, on 
workers’ right to consultation, did not confer enforceable rights on 
individuals); Poclava [2015] IRLR 453 (Charter only addressed to Member 
States and did not confer right on individuals not to be dismissed for 
unjustified reason).171 Conversely, the ECJ relied on Article 16, which refers to 
the “right to conduct a business”, in Alemo-Herron (above), to reduce the 
protection given by the Acquired Rights Directive. 
 
75. The one important exception to this is Article 47 of the Charter, which is in 
Title VI not Title IV, and which grants everyone a right to a effective remedy if 
their EU rights are violated. In Bernkharbouche v Sudan [2015] ICR 793, the 
Court of Appeal held that this right was horizontally effective and so could be 
used to disapply inconsistent national legislation. As a result it permitted 
embassy staff to bring employment claims based on EU law even though the 
State Immunity Act would deny them the right to bring claims as a matter of 
domestic law. (Note, too, that the Charter may restrict the UK Government’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
169 Commission’s document at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm  
170 See on this C Barnard, EU Employment Law, above, at pp 38-33. 
171 See too Advocate General Trstenjak in Dominguez [2012] IRLR 321, contending the same 
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freedom to depart from the ECHR if it introduces a Bill of Rights in place of 
the HRA 1998, at least in the sphere of EU law, because it guarantees rights 
similar to those in the ECHR.172 But this is more about civil and political 
rights, and less about labour rights.) 
 
76. Free Movement. I only highlight free movement rights here since they are not 
usually categorised as social rights. The right to free movement of workers is 
set out in Article 45 TFEU, which equally prohibits any discrimination based 
on nationality between workers173 and so supplements the protection of the 
Race Directive. That Directive does not apply to discrimination because of 
nationality,174 so that the nationality discrimination to which the domestic 
EqA 2010 applies175 is partly underpinned by Article 45.  
 
77. Economic freedoms and Posted Workers. The Posted Workers Directive 
96/71/EC (PWD), which I mentioned in the Introduction, gives a degree of 
protection to workers posted from one Member State to another. It guarantees 
the posted workers certain listed terms and conditions (including working 
time rules, minimum wage rates, health and safety standards and provisions 
on non-discrimination) that are applicable to workers in the State to which 
they are posted, provided these are laid down by (i) law, regulation or 
administrative provision or (ii) in relation to Annex 1 activities (mainly 
construction) collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been 
declared ‘universally applicable’.176 The PWD permits this to happen in legal 
systems such as the UK’s by the State adopting standards in generally 
applicable sectoral, geographical or national collective agreements.177 A 
Member State may in addition opt to include terms and conditions in 
‘universally applicable’ collective agreements in sectors other than 
                                                                                                                                                        
applied to the right to paid annual leave in Article 31 of the Charter. 
172 See especially Article 52. 
173 See O’Flynn [1996] ECR I-2617, which has been referred to since in the context of indirect 
discrimination. 
174 See Article 3(2). 
175 See s.9. 
176 See Article 3(1). 
177 See the definition of ‘generally applicable’ collective agreements in Article 3(8). 
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construction if it can show a sufficiently pressing social reason.178 It is now 
supplemented by a Directive intended to enhance the enforcement of the 
PWD by allowing e.g. workers in construction to recover under-payments of 
the national minimum wage from contractors other than their direct 
employer.179 In addition, there are recent proposals from the Commission to 
amend the PWD in future to address unfair practices and to extend collective 
agreements ‘universally applicable’ to all sectors, not just construction.180 
 
78. Although the PWD confers rights on posted workers and is said not to prevent 
national legislation which is more favourable to them,181 in light of its 
intersection with the economic freedoms in the Treaty, such as freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services in Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 
respectively, it has in practice come to be treated as a ceiling and not a floor of 
rights. This is a long and convoluted story and involves not just the economic 
freedoms but also the rules on public procurement, now set out in principally 
Directive 2014/24/EU.182 It is still being worked through by the ECJ, as shown 
by its recent ruling in Regiopost [2016] IRLR 125. But, broadly, the result is 
that in some circumstances the economic freedoms in EU law permit 
commercial organisations to resist conditions in public contracts requiring 
contractors to comply with labour standards, such as pay rates, which go 
beyond those set out in Article 3 of the PWD (for example, compliance with 
fair rates of pay which are higher than a statutory minimum wage183). By the 
same token, the Directive has limited the power of unions to take collective 
action in order to press for such higher standards. This is illustrated by Laval 
[2008] IRLR 160 where the ECJ, despite saying that the right to take collective 
action was a fundamental right under EU law,184 held it could not justify strike 
action by Swedish trade unions in the building sector aimed at compelling a 
                                                 
178 See Article 3(10) and Commission v Luxembourg [2009] IRLR 388 at §§48-55. 
179 See the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive 2014/67/EU, not yet implemented in the 
UK: see the consultation, BIS, Implementing the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive (July 2015). 
180 See the Commission Proposal of 8.3.16 (COM)(2016) 128 final. 
181 See Article 3(7). 
182 See too in the context of entities in the water, energy, transport and postal services, 
Directive 2014/25/EU. 
183 See especially Ruffert [2008] IRLR 467. 
184 See §91. 
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Latvian company to sign a collective agreement providing for rates of pay 
which were higher than those laid down in national legislation.185 Such action, 
according to the ECJ, was an interference with the freedom to provide services 
which could not be justified because it sought to enforce higher wage rates 
than those required by Article 3 of the PWD. 
 
79. Other cases show the same tendency. Thus, in Commission v Luxembourg 
[2009] IRLR 388 the ECJ held that Luxembourg laws implementing the PWD 
could not require contractors automatically to adjust pay in accordance with 
the cost of living or to abide by collective agreements which had not been 
declared universally applicable, because these rules went further than Article 
3 of the PWD required.186 Similarly, in Rüffert [2008] IRLR 467 a regional 
authority could not rely on regional legislation requiring contractors to pay 
workers in Germany (on the facts employed by a Polish subcontractor) in 
accordance with the minimum wage laid down in a sectoral collective 
agreement which had not been declared of universal application within the 
meaning of the PWD. But there are fine lines to be drawn here. For example, 
recently in Regiopost the ECJ distinguished Rüffert in not striking down a 
German regional law which provided that public contracts would only be 
awarded to contractors who paid its workers E8.50 gross per hour, a rate 
which did not apply in the private sector.187 Although there was no national 
minimum wage in Germany at the time, because the requirement was laid 
down in legislation which applied to all public contracts it met the 
requirement of Article 3 PWD, and so was a permissible social consideration 
to take into account under public procurement rules.188 The critical difference 
between the cases was that in Regiopost the regional law itself set the 
minimum wage generally applicable to public contractors, whereas in Rüffert 
the regional law merely referred to rates set out in collective agreements.189 
                                                 
185 See too Viking [2008] ICR 741. 
186 Cf. Sähköalohen [2015] IRLR 407, where a union could bring an action to force contractors 
to pay posted workers in accordance with a collective agreement which was universally applicable in 
Finland.  
187 See judgment at §§13-14.  
188 See §§73-77 of the judgement. 
189 In addition, in Regiopost the ECJ referred to Article 26 of the, then, Public Sector 
Procurement Directive 2004/18, allowing the use of ‘social considerations’ in public contracting - a 
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80. Regiopost may be the sign of a change in direction of the ECJ, towards 
allowing States and local authorities greater freedom to lay down compulsory 
wage rates applicable to public contracts, at least so long as these are laid 
down in some form of  ‘law’, whether national or regional. This freedom is 
only likely to be increased by the new Public Procurement Directive 
2014/24/EU, which expressly empowers contractors to reject bids which do 
not comply with obligations in social and labour law established by, among 
others, national labour law, collective agreements and various ILO 
Conventions.190 But in any case it is increasingly clear that provided the 
contract rules comply with the Posted Workers Directive, they will be 
permissible.191 As a result, first, the EU economic freedoms do not prevent a 
Member State laying down an increased mandatory rate of minimum pay in 
national law applying to all domestic workers, and therefore extending to 
posted workers192 (an example will be the forthcoming introduction of the 
national Living Wage, increasing the rate of the national minimum wage). 
Second, provided it used ‘law’ to do so, a regional authority could probably 
lay down fair wage rates applicable to all public sector contractors, just as the 
regional authority did in Regiopost. Third, EU law would not prevent a future 
UK Government favourably disposed to collective bargaining deciding to 
make wage rates set out in sectoral collective agreements legally binding on all 
contractors in that sector,193 a power which will be enhanced if the current 
Commission proposals lead to legislation extending the reach of ‘universally 
applicable’ collective agreements beyond the construction sector.194 It is worth 
pointing out that even before the Regiopost judgment and in the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                        
provision not in force at the time of Rüffert. 
190 See Articles 18(2) and 56 and Annex X (there are similar provisions in the Utilities 
Directive 2014/25/EU). See on this Abby Semple, A Practical Guide to Public Procurement, pp 106-110, 
and, on the former Directive 93/37/EEC, Case C225/98, Commission v France [2000] I-ECR 17445 
(permissible to include award criterion relating to combatting unemployment in local area). 
191 See recital (37) to the 2014 Public Procurement Directive. 
192 See Article 3 of the PWD. 
193 The most obvious means would be to give effect to the rates in national laws, by making 
the relevant rate a legal requirement in the sector or binding on all public contractors; alternatively, 
and less straightfowardly, the UK could make use of the procedure for declaring such agreements 
‘universally applicable’ in the PWD: see Article 3(8) and (10) of the PWD (but cf. Commission v 
Luxembourg, above, at §§49-55).  
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legally prescribed rates of pay, the Scottish Government made greater use of 
guidance to require contractors to observe fair labour terms.195  
 
(2) Status of EU-derived Rights After Brexit 
81. The other questions addressed in the Advice can be dealt with more shortly. 
The second question is the status of EU rights after a Brexit and the decisions 
which a UK Government might take to repeal existing labour rights protected 
by EU law. The answer to this question depends on too many contingencies to 
give anything more than general guidance. There is, so far as I am aware, no 
precedent for the kind of radical overhaul of laws which would potentially 
flow from Brexit. 
 
82. The legal effect of Brexit would not be immediately to deprive the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972) of legal effect. In the first place, the 
withdrawal process itself would take two years, the time to negotiate a 
withdrawal agreement if sooner or a longer period if that were agreed 
unanimously within the Council, under Article 50 TEU.  In principle, if the 
ECA 1972 were simply repealed, all delegated legislation made under it 
would be revoked by implication in the absence of an express saving in the 
repealing legislation. This is because a repeal is based on the fiction that the 
Act never existed: see Watson v Winch [1916] 1 KB 688 per Lord Reading CJ  - 
which has been considered since but not doubted. 
 
83. But it is almost unimaginable that the UK Government would simply repeal 
the ECA 1972 because that would lead to legal and commercial chaos. For 
example: 
 
(1) The UK would, presumably, need to enter into some form of trading 
agreement with the EU as to the nature of its future trading 
relationship, just as other States such as Norway or Switzerland which 
are not members of the EU have done. The terms of that trading 
                                                                                                                                                        
194  
195 See s.29 of the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 and the Statutory Guidance on the 
Selection of Tenderers and Award of Contracts (2015). 
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relationship are likely to dictate what provisions of EU law the UK 
would nonetheless still comply with. On the Norway model, where 
Norway signed the treaty establishing the European Economic Area 
(EAA), compliance is still necessary with EU social law which bears 
upon EAA activity,196 whereas the Swiss model is based on bilateral 
trade agreements.197 
 
(2) Some provisions giving effect to EU law are set out in primary 
legislation; examples are the protections against discrimination in the 
EqA 2010 and various sections of ERA which implement EU law, such 
as those protecting employees against detriments or dismissal in 
relation to EU-derived rights.198 Those provisions would be unaffected 
by any repeal of the ECA 1972.199 
 
(3) Moreover, many regulations introduced to implement EU law were not 
introduced under, or exclusively under, the ECA 1972. To illustrate 
with examples: the Working Time Regulations were made under the 
ECA; the Fixed-Term (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) 
Regulations were made under the Employment Act 2002, even though 
they implement an EU Directive, and many of the health and safety 
regulations implementing Directives were made under s.15 HSWA;200 
but TUPE 2006 were made under both the ECA 1972 and s.38 of the 
Employment Relations Act 1999, and the Management of Health and 
Safety at Work Regulations 1999 were made under both s.2 ECA and 
s.15 HSWA, as were the Agency Worker Regulations 2010; and so on. 
Thus, repeal of the ECA 1972 would not affect those Regulations made 
exclusively under another Act. More complicated still, where 
Regulations are passed under both the ECA 1972 and another statutory 
                                                 
196 Recent Directives state where they are relevant to the EAA: see e.g. the EWC Directive and 
the Parental Leave Directive, stating after the title “Text with EAA Relevance”. 
197 See Edward and Lane, European Union Law (2013) pp 902-905. 
198 See, for one example, the health and safety protections in ss 44 and 100, giving effect to the 
Framework Directive in this sphere. There are many, many others. 
199 Though adding to the complexity, in Northern Ireland some discrimination law is in 
secondary legislation. 
200 See e.g. the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992. 
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power, very difficult issues would arise if the ECA were repealed. A 
court would have to consider, I think, whether particular provisions 
could have been made under the domestic statute, such as s.15 HSWA, 
despite the repeal of the ECA. To take an example: which parts of the 
Agency Workers Regulations or the Management of Health and Safety 
at Work Regulations  could have been made under s.15 HSWA and so 
would still be lawfully made, and which could not?  
 
(4) There will be devolution issues to consider, to the extent that some 
regulations or statutes fall within the competence of the Scottish 
Parliament or Welsh Assembly or where legislation in Northern Ireland 
is different (a huge topic which I cannot go into here). 
 
(5) It would create enormous commercial uncertainty if ECA were 
repealed or regulations were simply revoked without any run-in period 
or without any explanation of the operation of transitional provisions. 
The effect of repeal of legislation, in the absence of specific transitional 
provisions, on existing transactions, rights and proceedings is 
extremely complicated, to say the least.201  Suppose TUPE were simply 
revoked post-Brexit, to take one example. Businesses and lawyers 
would want to know, for instance, from what date precisely a transfer 
was no longer governed by TUPE, how this affected rights of 
employees who transferred in the past under TUPE, to what extent e.g. 
a dismissal in the future because of a past transfer would be governed 
by the now revoked legislation, what was the effect on claims already 
issued, and so on. These questions are only some examples but they 
illustrate the kinds of impenetrable problems which would arise from 
revoking legislation without including detailed transitional provisions. 
 
84. For all these reasons I cannot imagine any Government would simply revoke 
wholesale EU-derived employment rights, or all the Regulations made under 
                                                 
201 See the Interpretation Act 1978 s.16, described by Bennion as “notoriously opaque 
drafting”, which summarises the complicated effect of the repeal of an Act in the absence of explicit 
transitional provisions. The same rules apply to delegated legislation, such as statutory instruments: 
see s.23 of that Act. 
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the ECA 1972, no matter how hostile it was to them. I expect that the process 
would occur gradually. There already exist models for how this might 
happen. For example, s.37 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 
gives a power to repeal or revoke health and safety regulations, subject to 
consultation with certain bodies, and provides that the revoking regulations 
may contain appropriate transitional or savings provisions.  Another model is 
in Part I of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, by which a 
Minister may introduce statutory instruments to remove ‘burdens’ resulting 
from legislation including primary legislation.202 The relevant order may 
include consequential or transitional provisions.203 The order cannot affect 
matters within the competence of the Scottish Parliament or Welsh 
Assembly.204 There are provisions by which the Minister must consult certain 
persons, including those representative of interests substantially affected by 
the proposals.205 This is the sort of statutory means that I think could be 
adapted to repeal, revoke or modify EU-derived employment rights. It would 
give the Government a power to act quickly and to pick and choose which 
parts of legislation it wanted to remove. 
 
(3) Implications for Inspectorates and for Civil Justice Processes 
85. The third question in my advice is the potential effect of Brexit on 
inspectorates such as the HSE and civil justice processes. 
 
86. Many EU Directives in the employment field expressly require effective 
remedies for breach. For example, Article 7 of the Racial Discrimination 
Directive 2000/43/EC states:206 
 
Member states shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative 
procedures, including where they consider it appropriate conciliation 
procedures, for the enforcement of the obligations under this Directive 
are available to all persons who consider themselves wronged by the 
                                                 
202 See s.1(1)(2)(6) and s.12. 
203 See s.1(8). 
204 See ss 9, 11. 
205 See s.12. 
206 See similarly Article 9 of the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC; Article 17 of the Sex 
Directive 2006/54. 
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failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them, even after the 
relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have occurred 
has ended. 
 
To ensure practical effectiveness, the Directives protecting against 
discrimination also reverse the burden of proof, require remedies for 
victimisation and require effective sanctions.207 In any case, as set out above, 
the duty to provide effective remedies in the field of EU law is now explicit in 
Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the EU Charter and is a general requirement 
of EU law. 
 
87. The means for giving effective remedies and sanctions is, however, generally a 
matter for  each Member State, provided that they are effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive (the principle of effectiveness) and provide analogous 
procedural rules and penalties as apply to similar infringements of national 
law (the principle of equivalence).208 It is not a requirement that any particular 
procedure or remedy is available, though if civil compensation is the route 
chosen the compensation must be adequate. These rules provide general 
constraints on how Member States implement EU law and have been 
summarised above. 
 
88. Until the recent changes removing civil liability for breach of health and safety 
regulations, the enforcement of health and safety regulations implementing 
EU Directives (and other health and safety regulations in the work sphere) 
was three-pronged: (i) civil claims for damages under s.47 HSWA: (ii) criminal 
prosecutions under ss 33-42 HSWA, taken by the DPP or the HSE; and (iii) 
enforcement action by the HSE issuing enforcement and prohibition notices 
under ss 18-26. Now only the last two survive (coupled with the possibility of 
actions based on directly effective provisions of Directives but only against 
emanations of the state). Under the Framework Directive 89/391, Member 
States are required to take the steps to ensure employers are subject to the 
legal provisions, and similar duties are contained in each ‘daughter’ 
                                                 
207 See e.g. Articles 7-9 and 15 of the Race Directive; Articles 9-11 and 17 of the Framework 
Directive. 
208 For a recent examination of the principles, see R (URTU) v Secretary of State for Transport 
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Directive.209 The Framework Directive, too, presupposes that there are 
national inspection agencies responsible for workers’ health and safety.210 
 
89. It has not yet been established if the removal of civil liability for breach of 
regulations implementing EU law is compatible with the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence. If, in addition, the HSE ceased to be able to 
enforce regulations in practice, the argument for a breach of the principle of 
effectiveness would be strengthened. Yet more clearly, in respect of the many 
sets of implementing rules where the exclusive remedy is a civil action, the 
compensation must be adequate for the loss and be a genuine deterrent. These 
rules, then, place clear limitations on what a Member State can do while it is in 
the EU. Should the UK leave the EU, it would be free to legislate as it wished - 
e.g. capping claims for civil compensation for any kind of breach of regulation 
or making some kinds of damages irrecoverable. 
 
90. In summary: so far as I am aware there is no requirement of EU law that any 
particular form of remedy be available for infringement of EU rights. But the 
overriding consideration is that there are effective sanctions. So if the means 
chosen is civil compensation for breach, as is the case with most domestic 
legislation implementing EU Directives in employment, compensation must 
be full; if the means chosen are criminal sanctions, these must in practice work 
effectively. A Brexit would place an end to these important limitations on the 
UK Government’s power. 
 
(4) The Protection of Domestic Legislation or the Common Law 
91. The fourth issue on which I am asked to advise is how national legislation or 
the common law will or is likely to protect workers’ rights in the event of 
Brexit. This is potentially a large topic but I will summarise the position. 
 
92. The common law. It is no exaggeration to say that, apart from health and 
safety where the common law of negligence provides a reasonable degree of 
                                                                                                                                                        
[2013] IRLR 890. 
209 See e.g. Article 9 of the Manual Handling Directive. 
210 See Articles 10(3)(c) and 11(6). 
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protection to injured workers, the common law provides almost no effective 
protection of workers’ rights. To summarise: 
 
(1) The common law of contract gives almost no recognition of the 
inequality of bargaining power which is a normal incident of the 
individual employment relationship.211 It is consequently entirely 
possible for the party with greater bargaining power, almost always the 
employer, to dictate terms. It is precisely for this reason that worker 
protection statutes prohibit contracting out save in certain specified 
circumstances, such as settlement of legal disputes212 (though the last 
Government already took some steps to undermine this fundamental 
principle213); if they did not, standard form contracts, given on a ‘take it 
or leave it’ basis would contract out of all social rights. A contract could 
validly provide that a worker is entitled to pay at a derisory level (even 
no pay, as in the case of interns), is guaranteed no work (as is the case 
for workers on zero hours contracts), is required to work overtime for 
nil pay, is entitled to no holiday or no paid holiday, and can be 
dismissed at any time for any or no reason on one day’s notice. These 
may be extreme examples but even more extreme provisions were 
included in contracts in the past, when freedom of contract 
dominated.214 They illustrate that contract law provides almost no 
protection against the party who is able to dictate the express written 
terms - hence the repeated need for statutory intervention, even simply 
to establish minimum notice periods,215 and something clearly 
demonstrated today by the terms of employment of some ‘precarious’ 
workers, such as those on zero hours contract. As a matter of contract 
                                                 
211 The exception which proves the rule is that courts now recognise inequality of bargaining 
power as relevant to whether a contract of self-employment is a sham: see Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] 
ICR 1157. 
212 See e.g. ERA s.203. 
213 See the new category of employee shareholder in s.205A ERA, a form of contracting out of 
some labour rights. 
214 Past contractual provisions included terms by which fines were deductible from wages for 
poor performance, wages were only payable at the completion of the period of hiring (such as a year), 
so that no wages were payable at all if a contract was terminated for breach beforehand: see Cornish, 
The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol XXIII, pp 636-49. 
215 Dating back to the Contracts of Employment Act 1963. 
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law, for example, any strike is a fundamental breach of contract which 
entitles the employer to terminate the employment summarily with no 
pay or to deduct wages for the strike days.  
 
(2) The only realistic antidote to the common law’s approach to terms and 
conditions of employment is by collective bargaining, which is often an 
effective means of redressing the inequality of bargaining power in the 
relationship between individual employee and employer. But collective 
bargaining is not encouraged or mandated by the common law, and its 
operation has largely occurred despite the law not because of it;216 the 
common law continues to look at the contract of employment through 
the prism of the relationship between the individual parties. Where it 
exists, collective bargaining may provide a factual corrective to the 
imbalance of power between the worker and employer (e.g. on pay 
rates); where it does not exist, the common law provides workers with 
almost no significant protection. 
 
(3) Judges sometimes celebrate the development of the implied term of 
trust and confidence, by which an employer must not without 
reasonable and proper cause conduct itself in a manner which is 
calculated or likely to damage the relationship of trust and confidence 
in the employment relationship.217 But in practical terms the implied 
term places little brake on an employer who wishes to introduce terms 
of employment which are highly unfair, or to change terms and 
conditions to workers’ detriment. The implied term has little to say 
about e.g. the level of pay. Most important of all the implied term has 
no application at all to the decision to dismiss, so that the common law 
continues to allow an employer to dismiss arbitrarily, for any reason or 
no reason.218 Consequently, an employer who wishes to change 
                                                 
216 Hence the celebrated phrase of Kahn-Freund, describing the past system in the UK as 
based on ‘collective laissez-faire’. 
217 See Malik v BCCI [1997] ICR 606, especially per Lord Steyn. 
218 Johnson v Unisys [2001] ICR 480. There is an unusual exception for ‘office holders’ or those 
whose terms and conditions are underpinned by statute; these exceptions are irrelevant to most 
workers. 
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workers’ terms and conditions to their detriment can, at common law, 
simply dismiss them on notice and give them offers of new, worse, 
terms and conditions. As a matter of contract law, this strategy, 
commonly employed in the context of e.g. pay cuts in recent years, 
involves no breach of contract - dismissal is on notice, in accordance 
with the contract, and the workers then ‘agree’ to the new terms. The 
workers options are to have no job or to accept new, worse, terms. It 
has the result that what look like contractual ‘rights’ are effectively 
written in sand: the employer can dictate their content by its 
unconstrained right to dismiss and to replace them with new terms and 
conditions. 
 
(4) Even if a dismissal is in breach of contract because e.g. the employer 
was not entitled to dismiss summarily, damages are limited to the lost 
earnings during the notice period which, for most employees, is a 
minimal amount. Damages are not available for the loss of reputation 
to a wrongfully dismissed employee, even where this is caused by 
breach of an express term: see Edwards v Chesterfield [2012] 2 AC 22 - a 
remarkable decision, unique in not allowing damages for breach of 
contract, but illustrative of the common law’s jealous preserve of the 
employer’s prerogative power to dismiss. 
 
(5) In the sphere of health and safety, the common law tort of negligence 
provides a degree of significant protection. But it is still subject to 
important limitations. First, it is necessary to prove that  an employer 
was at fault, which means it is harder to succeed in claims than for 
breaches of ‘strict’ statutory duties; this is shown by the decision in 
Stark v Post Office [2000] ICR 1013 where the Court of Appeal held 
that the duty to maintain work equipment in good repair, flowing from 
the Work Equipment Directive, was a strict obligation so that an 
employer was liable for a defect in postal worker’s bike, even though 
this would not have been revealed by an inspection.219 Second, the tort 
                                                 
219 Workers can no longer rely on this ruling in personal injury claims because the 
Government has now removed civil liability for breach of regulations under the HSWA: see above. 
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requires in general terms a personal injury for a claim and does not, 
save in some unusual circumstances, provide a remedy for economic 
loss.220 It will not assist workers who are subject to detrimental 
treatment where they do not suffer any physical or psychiatric injury. 
 
93. I doubt that any of the social rights which I have set out above are part of the 
common law or are significantly protected by it; to the extent they can be read 
into the implied term of trust and confidence, the protection of the common 
law is illusory because the employer can always just dismiss an employee who 
it does not like or wish to retain by giving notice. The common law provides 
no restriction on the power of the employer to dictate the terms of the 
contract; allows the employer to change those terms at any time by the device 
of dismissal and re-engagement; provides no restriction whatsoever on the 
right of an employer to dismiss for any or no reason; and gives no proper 
compensation for wrongfully dismissed employees. The only valid protection 
given by the common law is to those workers unfortunate enough to suffer an 
injury due to their employer’s fault.  
 
94. Legislation. The extent to which, post-Brexit domestic legislation continues to 
provide protection for workers is, in essence, a judgment about the direction 
of future politics. In areas in which the EU does not have competence, such as 
pay or dismissal,221 national law alone provides some protection, in the form 
of the National Minimum Wage Act and unfair dismissal law(for those 
employees with sufficient continuous employment). Those rights are 
unaffected by EU law. Though for the moment the national minimum wage 
has a degree of political consensus, illustrated by the forthcoming National 
Living Wage,222 I do not think the same can be said of unfair dismissal law, in 
relation to which the coalition Government already took steps to reduce its 
impact by increasing the qualifying period from one year to two, reducing the 
amount of compensation to a maximum of one year’s pay and introducing a 
                                                 
220 But cf. Spring v Guardian [1994] ICR 496: duty to take reasonable care and skill in 
providing reference. 
221 See e.g. Article 153(5) and the discussion of AG Trstenjak in British Airways v Williams 
[2012] ICR 847 at §§60-92 and Poclava [2015] IRLR 453. 
222 See now the National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Regulations 2016. 
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form of contracting out by means of employee shareholders.223 As to rights 
backed by EU law, I have identified likely targets, in the medium- and long-
term, especially of a Government dominated by an ideology of deregulation. It 
is easy to contemplate a complete reversal of the gradual increase in social 
regulation protecting workers which has taken place since the 1960s, just as 
past Conservative Governments radically overhauled the law on strikes from 
the 1980s onwards.  
 
(5) Enforcing and Relying on EU law and ECJ judgments after Brexit 
95. The final question on which I am asked to advise is the mechanisms for 
enforcing EU-derived rights after Brexit, and the extent to which the case-law 
of the ECJ would continue to apply. Several fundamental consequences would 
follow. 
 
96. First, workers in the UK would no longer be able to rely on the doctrine of 
direct effect. This would mean that they could not enforce sufficiently precise 
Articles of Directives against emanations of the state, and could not rely 
horizontally, against private employers, on sufficiently precise Articles of the 
Treaties (such as Article 157 TFEU on equal pay), directly effective Articles of 
the EU Charter or the direct effect of fundamental principles of EU law, such 
as the right not to be discriminated against. This means that if the UK 
Government repealed existing domestic implementing legislation, workers 
would be left with no means of upholding rights flowing from EU law. 
Suppose, for example, post-Brexit the Government repealed the Working 
Time Regulations. There would be nothing left for workers to enforce in 
relation to their working time, save what the employer chose to give them as 
contractual rights. 
 
97. Second, once the UK leaves the EU, any EU Directives conferring social rights 
or amending existing Directives post-Brexit would be largely irrelevant in the 
UK. A UK court might look at them, but it is hard to see how they would be 
relevant to the interpretation of national law because national law would no 
longer be implementing, or intended by Parliament to implement, those later 
                                                 
223 See ss 108(1), 124(1ZA), 205A ERA.   
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Directives.  
 
98. The most complicated area is likely to be the effect on the interpretative 
obligation, referred to as the Marleasing duty. As noted above, this duty has 
radical implications, and has enabled the domestic courts to read words into 
domestic statutes to comply with EU law. The origin of the duty is based on 
the TEU and, in particular, the duty of a Member State under Article 4(3) TEU 
to take “any appropriate measures...to ensure fulfilment of the obligations  
arising from the Treaties” or from other EU legal instruments, and to ensure 
the full effect of EU law in each Member State, a duty which applies equally to 
a Member State and the courts in the UK: see Von Colson [1984] ECR 1891, 
Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135 at §8, and Pfeiffer [2005] ICR 1307 per the Grand 
Chamber of the ECJ at §§110-114. 
 
99. Once that keystone to the duty is removed, and the associated duties in the 
Treaties such as e.g. that a Directive is binding as to the result to be 
achieved,224 I think the radical effect of the Marleasing duty will gradually be 
lost. The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation from a domestic 
perspective is to determine the intention of Parliament, based above all on the 
language used by Parliament in that legislation. To begin with the courts 
might accept that some, unrevoked, regulations implementing EU law were 
intended to give effect to the Directive and so should be interpreted in that 
light. But these domestic rules would reach their limit in cases such as 
Coleman No. 2 (provisions on associate discrimination read into DDA) or Bear 
Scotland (words added to Working Time Regulations to ensure workers 
received correct level of holiday pay). Domestic courts are likely, that is, to 
pay much more regard to the words used by Parliament, and are unlikely to 
‘distort’ the natural meaning to ensure compliance with what the ECJ decides 
a Directive, approached in accordance with its objectives, should mean. I think 
over time the duty to interpret will become much less aggressive, similar to 
how the courts approach the duty to interpret national law in the case of 
‘normal’ Treaties to which the UK is a signatory.225 
                                                 
224 Article 288 TFEU. 
225 See §10 above. 
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100. This division between ECJ decisions on Directives and domestic courts’ 
rulings on regulations will, I think, only grow deeper across time. First, it will 
no longer be possible for a domestic court to refer a question to the ECJ on the 
proper interpretation of a Directive under Article 267 TFEU, as is common at 
the moment. There are several good examples where domestic courts 
apparently changed their mind about the proper interpretation of a domestic 
statute only because of a ruling of the ECJ from a reference: see e.g. Webb v 
EMO where, prior to the reference, the House of Lords seemed to consider a 
comparator was required in pregnancy discrimination only to change its mind 
after the judgment of the ECJ.226 Second, across time, the domestic courts will 
come to return to more traditional means of interpretation, giving greater 
prominence to the language used by Parliament and less weight to decisions 
of the ECJ based on the meaning of the Directive. The result will be a much 
decreased ability to give reinterpretations to implementing regulations which 
are different from how they would be ordinarily interpreted. 
 
101. But there is a third, more fundamental, reason why rulings of the ECJ on what 
a Directive meant would be much less significant. Suppose the ECJ delivered a 
judgment on interpretation of a Directive which was favourable to workers, 
and the domestic courts followed that ECJ ruling because they considered 
Parliament intended to enact implementing legislation which complied with 
the Directive and the domestic legislation could be interpreted in that light. 
Freed from the obligation to comply with EU law under the Treaties, a 
Government which was opposed to that ruling could then simply pass 
legislation to reverse the effect of the judgments of the ECJ and/or of the 
domestic courts. The Government would have the same freedom and power it 
has when a domestic court gives a ruling on a domestic statute with the 
Government opposes: it can change the law, at least for the future. I very 
much doubt, for example, that the Government would have stood by had the 
domestic courts interpreted equal pay laws or working time rules in the way 
the ECJ has done. It would simply have used Parliamentary sovereignty to 
reverse the court rulings it did not like. For the future, the Government’s 
                                                 
226 See [1993] ICR 175 and compare its decision after the ruling of the ECJ - [1995] ICR 1021. 
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power is facilitated because much of the domestic legislation implementing 
EU law (and setting out other labour rights) is set out in statutory instruments, 
which can quickly be revoked or amended. There are already good examples 
of the Government acting speedily to amend primary legislation to protect 
businesses, illustrated by the statutory instrument made only about one 
month after the ruling in Bear Scotland and which amended ERA 1996 to limit 
the temporal effect of holiday pay claims.227 The Government clearly thought 
the decision was detrimental to businesses and so did what it thought it could 
get away with to reverse it. Following Brexit, the Government’s power to do 
this would greatly increase. 
 
Summary 
102. This Advice has covered a very wide territory and much detail. It is not easy 
to summarise the key conclusions but below I try to do so. 
 
103. First, some areas such as pay and dismissal are excluded from the scope of EU 
social law and are thus largely within the domain of national law. The 
principal areas of rights at work on which EU law has had and continues to 
have a very significant effect include the following: 
 
(1) Discrimination of all kinds now protected under the EqA 2010,228 at all 
stages of employment, including selection for employment, pay and 
working conditions, dismissal and treatment post-employment  
 
(2) Protection of pregnant workers, and rights to maternity and parental 
leave. 
 
(3) Protection of part-time and fixed-term workers. 
 
(4) Protection of agency workers. 
 
                                                 
227 See the Deduction from Wages (Limitation) Regulations 2014, made on 17.12.14 when the 
judgment in Bear Scotland was handed down in November 2014. 
228 Note the slightly different treatment of nationality discrimination. 
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(5) Important rights relating to working time, including rights to daily and 
weekly rest, maximum weekly working time, paid annual leave and 
measures to protect night workers. 
 
(6) Legal rights to collective information and consultation which operate 
now across a broad range of contexts, including collective 
redundancies, transfers of undertakings, health and safety, and in all 
undertakings above a certain size. 
 
(7) Protection of rights of workers in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
especially relevant to contracting out exercises. 
 
(8) Many important regulations on health and safety at work. 
 
(9) Important protection of workers’ rights, guaranteed by the State, in the 
event of the insolvency of their employer. 
 
(10) Other provisions, including rights to a written statement of terms and 
conditions, protection of data processing and collection on workers, 
and some, limited, rights in the EU Charter, and guarantees of legally 
required terms and conditions to posted workers. 
 
104. These EU social rights, second, are currently the subject of very strong legal 
guarantees, much stronger than other rights flowing from international 
treaties signed by the UK. By a variety of means, the UK Government, State 
bodies and the courts are required to give effect to EU-derived employment 
rights, and to ensure effective remedies for infringement of those rights, 
including full compensation where the means of enforcement is individual 
claims. They effectively prevent the Government acting to override them, and 
require the UK to give full practical effect to them. 
 
105. Third, at present almost all EU-derived employment rights operate as a floor, 
not a ceiling and do not prevent a Member State, if it so chooses, enacting 
domestic legislation which gives a higher level of protection to workers. The 
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partial exception to this is the effect of economic freedoms in the Treaties as 
they intersect with the Posted Workers Directive; but these freedoms operate 
more as a brake on collective action than on legal measures to improve 
workers’ rights. 
 
106. Fourth, in the event of Brexit, a future Government would have almost 
complete legal freedom of action in relation to those areas of working life 
currently protected by EU social rights. The duties set out in other 
international treaties which the UK has ratified place a much weaker restraint 
on a Government committed to deregulation in the employment sphere. 
 
107. Fifth, it is much harder to predict which provisions currently guaranteed by 
EU law a future Government with a deregulatory agenda would target for 
repeal or amendment in the near future, but I have tried to identify likely 
targets based on policy documents of the present and previous Governments. 
I think that EU-guaranteed rights especially vulnerable to repeal in the name 
of deregulation, austerity or reducing burdens on business include  provisions 
on collective consultation; many working time rights (especially the level of 
pay in respect of annual leave); some of the EU-derived health and safety 
regulations; substantial parts of TUPE; legislation protecting agency workers 
and other ‘atypical’ workers; and those elements of discrimination law 
imposing what are seen as  large financial awards on employers, such as equal 
pay awards for long-standing discrimination in pay arrangements (and 
perhaps discrimination on which there is less political consensus, such as age 
discrimination). Provisions which place significant costs on businesses or the 
Government, such as insolvency protection, are also vulnerable to repeal in 
times of austerity. But all the social rights in employment currently required 
by EU law would be potentially vulnerable and a Government highly 
committed to labour market deregulation might go much further.  
 
108. Sixth, the likely legal mechanism used to amend or repeal legal rights 
guaranteed by EU law would not simply be the repeal of the ECA 1972. It is 
more likely that a Government with a deregulatory agenda would revoke, 
amend or repeal legislation piece by piece, including transitional provisions to 
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clarify how these changes affect past and future transactions. 
 
109. Seventh, Member States are required to ensure that sanctions for breach of 
EU-derived rights are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and provide 
analogous procedural rules and penalties as apply to similar infringements of 
national law. These rules mean that if civil claims are the route chosen for 
enforcing EU rights, which they usually are, the compensation must be and 
adequate and a genuine deterrent; if criminal sanctions are used, they too 
must ensure adequate protection in practice. A Brexit would free a 
Government from these constraints, allowing it to introduce caps on 
compensation or other measures to limit the practical enforcement of rights. 
 
110. Eighth, the common law provides almost no effective protection of workers’ 
rights because it places no effective restriction on the power of the employer to 
dictate the terms of the contract; allows the employer to changes those terms 
at any time by the device of dismissal and re-engagement; provides no 
restriction whatsoever on the right of an employer to dismiss for any or no 
reason; and gives no proper compensation for wrongfully dismissed 
employees. The only valid protection given by the common law is to those 
workers unfortunate enough to suffer an injury due to their employer’s fault. 
Whether statute law would compensate workers for the absence of protection 
under common law is, ultimately, a political question; but the signs from the 
previous and present Government point to a reversal of many of the 
important social rights currently guaranteed by EU law. 
 
111. Ninth, post-Brexit the mechanisms for enforcing EU-derived rights would 
greatly diminish. Workers will not be able to enforce EU rights directly; the 
duty to interpret national law in accordance with EU law will greatly weaken; 
and, most fundamentally, a future Government could simply reverse legal 
rulings it did not like. 
 
MICHAEL FORD QC 
10 March 2016 
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